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reviewed t h e  r e p o r t  o f  t he  Committee on State and Local Issues 
and approved a motion t o  forward the  committee's recommendations 
t o  t h e  F i f t y - f o u r t h  General Assembly. 
Respect fu l l y  submitted, 
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Senate Jo in t  Resolutlon No. 19, 1982 session, d l rec ted the 
Leg l s l a t l ve  Councll t o  appoint a commlttee t o  study: 
(a)  The "new federal lsmu 
l l m l t e d  to:  
whlch would Include, but  not  be 
( 1 ) T h e  cur rent  funct lons asslgned t o  s ta te  and loca l  
governments and whlch leve l  of government I s  most su l tab le  
t o  administer such functlons; 
(11) The sources of 	 revenue a t  the s ta te  1 eve1 and the l oca l  
l eve l  u t l l l z e d  t o  fund the admlnlstrat lon o f  such 
functlons; and 
(111) The po ten t la l  Impact o f  "new federal Ism" proposal s 	 on the 
sources o f  revenue - ava l lab le  t o  s ta te  and loca l  
governments. 
Pursuant t o  the  above d l rec t l ve ,  the Committee on State-Local 
Issues (New Federal Ism) undertook a study o f  recent ly  enacted o r  
proposed In1  t l a t l v e s  o f  the  Reagan Admlnlstrat lon and the percelved 
Impacts of these I n l t l a t l v e s  on s ta te  and loca l  governments. The 
canmlttee devoted most of I t s  a t t en t i on  t o  two o f  these l n l t l a t l v e s  --
block grants, and the so-cal led "New Federal Ism" proposal o f  1982. 
Recommended Leg Is l  a t  Ion 
As a r e s u l t  o f  I t s  del Iberatlons, the commlttee recommends two 
b l l l s :  
1) B i l l  1 provldes f o r  the s ta te  reimbursement o f  costs borne by the 
countles f o r  the admln ls t ra t lon o f  the o l d  age pension fund. 
Reimbursements w i l l  be made from the o l d  age pension fund, I n  
1 l eu  o f  the count ies '  re1 lance on t h e l r  own revenue base ( l a r g e l y  
property taxes) f o r  these costs. 
2) 8111 2 provldes f o r  the legislative appropr lat lon of ce r t a l n  
federal funds, especlal l y  those a1 located t o  the s ta te  under the 
block grant  program established I n  the "Onnibus Budget 
Reconcll i a t l o n  Act o f  1981," The b l l l  a1 so creates an l n te r lm  
f inanc ia l  overview comnlttee whose dut ies  w l l l  Include: the 
review o f  executlve agency appl l ca t lons  f o r  federal b lock grant  
funds; approval o f  execut l ve  agency a1 1 ocatlons o f  federal funds 
between s ta te  and loca l  government uses dur lng the lnter lm; 
approval o f  changes I n  program fundlng leve ls  durlng the lnter lm, 
subject  t o  l l m l t a t l o n s  I n  the long approprlat lons b l l l ;  and 
advlslng executlve agencles on pol I c y  changes durlng the l n te r lm  
necessl ta ted  by changes I n  federal pol i c y  o r  fundlng leve l  , 
The b i l l  contains several 1 im i ta t ions  on the committee's 
in te r im a c t i v l t y  inc luding:  adherence t o  expressed l e g i s l a t i v e  
po l icy ;  a requirement t h a t  an immediate need ex is ts  when 
approving o r  changing a program funding leve l ;  l i m i t i n g  the 
e f f e c t  o f  committee decisions t o  the f i s c a l  year i n  which they 
are made; and provid ing f o r  disapproval o f  comni t t e e  decisions by 
the General Assembly. The committee w i l l  r epor t  t o  the General 
Assembly a t  the s t a r t  o f  each l e g i s l a t i v e  session on i t s  a c t i v i t y  
during the previous interim. 
Other Recomnendati ons 
Creation o f  j o i n t  committee t o  continue study. The committee 
recomnends t h a t  the General Assembly establ  i s h  by j o i n t  reso lu t ion a 
six-person j o i n t  committee t o  continue i t s  review - and monitoring o f  
federal I n i t i a t i v e s  which have the potent ia l  f o r  inf luencing s ta te  
pol icy. It i s  the stated i n t e n t  o f  the Reagan Administrat ion t o  
enhance the r o l e  o f  s ta te  government i n  the federal system, but no t  
enough i s  y e t  known o f  the spec i f i c  form these "federal ism" 
i n i t i a t i v e s  w i l l  take, nor the appropriate means by which the s ta te  
should respond. The block grant  program i s  not  y e t  f u l l y  implemented 
i n  the state, and i t  has been proposed t ha t  the ex is t ing  block grants 
be expanded and t ha t  new block grants be created (though Congress has 
no t  ye t  acted on these proposals). As we1 1, the New Federal ism 
proposal has no t  been presented t o  Congress, but  i t s  considerat ion i s  
expected i n  the coming year. For these reasons, the committee i s  o f  
the opinion t h a t  the General Assembly needs t o  have i n  place a 
mechanism such as t h i s  j o i n t  committee t o  keep abreast o f  federal 
po l i c y  which i s  expected t o  change rap id l y  i n  the near future. 
C r i t e r i a  f o r  program review by committees o f  reference. As 
federal  programs are t ranster red t o  the s ta te  f o r  administrat ion, 
comnittees o f  reference i n  the General Assembly w i l l  1 i kely be 
required t o  assume more responsi b i  1 i t y  f o r  making programmatic 
decisions. To t h a t  end, the committee suggests c r i t e r i a  which w i l l  
a i d  i n  t h i s  decision-making process. ( ~ h e s e  c r i t e r i a  appear on pages 
28 t o  29.) 
State-mandated programs. I n  the course o f  i t s  in te r im study, the 
committee considered the issue o f  state-mandated prosrams administered 
by loca l  governments, which has o f ten  been the subject of debate i n  
the General Assembly. It was observed tha t  the federal funding f o r  
many loca l  programs w i l l  1 i ke ly  decl ine, p lacing greater demands on 
loca l  governments f o r  the continued f inancing o f  many o f  these 
programs. Local governments contend t ha t  t h e i r  f i s c a l  decision-making 
i s a1 ready constrained by the ex i  stence o f  numerous s ta te  mandates 
they must fund. Rather than make any spec i f i c  recomnendation 
concerning the issue o f  s t a te  mandates, the committee suggest t ha t  the 
General Assembly continue t o  review programs now mandated on loca l  
governments. 
FEDERALISM PROPOSALS REVIEWED BY COMMITTEE 

Over the  course o f  the  i n te r im ,  the  committee has reviewed 
severa l  i n i  t i a t i v e s  undertaken by the  Reagan Administration designed 
t o  s t rengthen the  r o l e  of s t a t e  and l o c a l  government i n  the  fede ra l  
process. P r i m a r i l y ,  t he  commlttee devoted i t s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  two o f  
these proposals. One i s  the b lock  g r a n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  enacted by 
Congress i n  1981 and now i n  e f f e c t  i n  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  t h e  s tates.  
Second i s  t h e  "New Federal ism" package proposed by Pres ident  Reagan 
e a r l y  i n  1982. 
Two fac ts  became apparent t o  the  committee as the  i n t e r i m  
progressed: t h e  "New Federal ism" proposal, which was the  i n i t i a l  focus 
of committee d iscuss ion  and was the  o b j e c t  o f  in tense Washington 
a c t i v i t y  e a r l y  i n  t h e  i n te r im ,  had reached impasse a t  t h e  fede ra l  
l e v e l  and was be ing  withdrawn from f u r t h e r  cons ide ra t i on  u n t i l  1983; 
and secondly, a  number o f  issues regard ing  the  implementat ion o f  t he  
b lock  g ran ts  became known t o  t h e  committee, p resent ing  a  more t i m e l y  
and p r a c t i c a l  sub jec t  f o r  considerat ion.  
The f o l l o w i n g  sec t ions  o f  the  r e p o r t  on recent  federa l  ism 
proposals w i l l  d iscuss the  "New Federal ism" and the  b lock g r a n t  
i n i t i a t i v e s ,  as w e l l  as o thers  which appear t o  impact s ta te - federa l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
"New Federalism" I n i t i a t i v e  
The committee's d i r e c t i v e  i n  Senate J o i n t  Resolut ion 19 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  noted "New Federal ism" as an issue f o r  the  committee t o  
s tudy over t he  i n te r im .  I n  response t o  t h i s  charge, t he  committee 
undertook a  rev iew o f  t he  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  proposal and i t s  perceived 
r a m i f i c a t i o n s  on t h e  state.  The committee was informed mid-point  i n  
t he  i n te r im ,  however, t h a t  t he  Reagan Admin i s t ra t i on  would n o t  submit 
t h e  proposal t o  Congress u n t i l  some t ime i n  1983. A f t e r  having 
devoted a  cons iderab le  amount o f  t ime t o  d iscuss ions  of "New 
Federalism," t h e  committee was o f  t he  op in ion  t h a t  f u r t h e r  
cons ide ra t i on  o f  t h i s  i ssue would be unwarranted. 
Therefore, t he  f o l l o w i n g  i s  o n l y  a  b r i e f  o u t l i n e  o f  t he  major  
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  the  "New Federal ismtt i n i t i a t i v e ,  and i s  presented f o r  
i n fo rma t i ona l  purposes only.  
I n  h i s  S ta te  o f  t h e  Union address i n  January o f  1982, Pres ident  
Reagan o u t l  ined a proposal t h a t  would c o n s t i t u t e  a  major s h i f t  i n  
program responsi  b i 1  it y  from federa l  t o  s t a t e  governments. The 
proposal, which i s  o u t l  ined below, was a c t i v e l y  considered i n  
Washington du r i ng  the  e a r l y  p a r t  o f  the  i n te r im ,  as the  Reagan 
Admin i s t ra t i on  negot ia ted  the  substance o f  t h e i r  proposal w i t h  
rep resen ta t i ves  o f  a  v a r i e t y  o f  pub1 i c  i n t e r e s t  groups -- Nat ional  
Conference o f  S ta te  Leg is la tu res ,  Nat iona l  Governors' Associat ion,  
National League o f  C i t i e s ,  Nat ional Assoc ia t ion  o f  Counties, and the 
United States Conference o f  Mayors. 
I n  Ju ly ,  t he  admin i s t ra t i on  released the  contents o f  t he  rev ised 
proposal which r e s u l t e d  from the  negot ia t ions  w i t h  the  above-mentioned 
pub1 i c  i n t e r e s t  groups. Shor t l y  t he rea f te r ,  most o f  these 
organizat ions adopted p o s i t i o n  statements which i nd i ca ted  waning 
enthusiasm f o r  the proposal. According t o  a v a r i e t y  o f  newspaper 
accounts: the Nat ional  Governors ' Associat ion moved from suppor t i ve  
t o  undecided; the Nat ional  League of C i t i e s  s h i f t e d  from lean ing  i n  
favor  t o  s t r o n g l y  opposed; and the  Uni ted States Conference o f  Mayors 
became more s t r o n g l y  opposed t o  the proposal. The National 
Associat ion o f  Counties was repor ted  t o  be the  on ly  one o f  t he  
nego t i a t i ng  organ iza t ions  r e t a i n i n g  a  suppor t i ve  posture t o  the 
proposal. A t  i t s  annual conference i n  1  a t e  July,  NCSL approved a  
reso l  u t i  on which s ta ted  t h a t  i t  n e i t h e r  endorses nor  r e j e c t s  proposal s  
presented t o  date. 
-Features o f  New Federal ism Proposal 
Three bas ic  fea tures  charac ter ize  the  Pres ident 's  proposal , and 
though a l l  th ree  were rev i sed  i n  the  J u l y  d r a f t ,  i t s  basic  t h r u s t  was 
unchanged. The th ree  fea tures  are: 
--	 a  "swap," which would t o t a l l y  f e d e r a l i z e  the  medicaid program 
i n  exchange f o r  t he  s t a t e s '  assumption o f  res  o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
a i d  t o  farnil i e s  w i t h  dependent ch i1  dren (AFDC 7 ; 
- - 	 a "turn-backt' o f  35 federal  programs t o  the  states;  and 
- - 	 a  federal  ism t r u s t  fund t o  p rov ide  revenues t o  the  s ta tes  f o r  
funding o f  turn-back program a c t i v i t i e s .  
Medicaid swap. Medicaid programs a re  c u r r e n t l y  administered by 
each o f  the i n d i v i d u a l  s tates,  w i t h  funding responsi b i l  i t i e s  shared 
between s t a t e  and federa l  governments. The federa l  ism i n i t i a t i v e  
envis ions federa l  assumption o f  $18.3 b i l l i o n  i n  s t a t e  medicaid 
f inanc ing  f o r  FY 1984, wh i l e  t he  s ta tes  would assume a  pro jec ted  $8.1 
b i l l  i on  federa l  responsi b i l  i t y  f o r  f i nanc ing  o f  AFDC programs. 
Therefore, the  s ta tes  would r e a l i z e  a  n e t  savings o f  $10.2 b i l l  i on  by 
exchanging medicaid f o r  AFDC costs, and would have these funds 
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  f i nanc ing  programs s la ted  f o r  turn-back t o  the  states. 
The o r i g i n a l  proposal inc luded the s t a t e s '  assumption o f  the food 
stamp program, b u t  i t  was dropped from cons idera t ion  dur ing the  
aforementioned negot ia t ions .  
The federal  i zed  medicaid program w u l  d  inc lude two basic  
components -- a r o u t f n e  care program and long-term care. I n  r o u t i n e  
care, seven basic  mandatory serv ices w u l d  be provided by the  s ta tes  
t o  qua1i f y  f o r  federal reimbursement. States c u r r e n t l y  prov ide 
medicaid serv ices a t  vary ing  l e v e l s  and t o  d i f f e r e n t  e l i g i b i l i t y  
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groups as determined by t h e i r  own statutes.  The proposed federal  
program would essen t ia l  l y  be an acute care program, w i t h  e l  i g i  b i l  it y  
determined on a uni form na t iona l  standard.. 
Long-term care provided t o  medicaid pa t ien ts  c u r r e n t l y  
c o n s t i t u t e s  the l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  expenditure f o r  any o f  t he  reimbursable 
services. I n  the  proposal, long-term care would be administered as a 
b lock  g ran t  t o  the  s ta tes  which can be supplemented by the  states. 
Turn-back of programs t o  the  states. The President i n i t i a l l y  
proposed the  s t a t e  takeover o f  43 federa l  education, t ranspor ta t ion ,  
community development, and soc ia l  serv ice  programs. The o v e r a l l  
program was described as a do1 la r - fo r -do1 l a r  exchange o f  programs, 
w i t h  turn-back program funding der ived from s t a t e  medicaid savings and 
the  federal  ism t r u s t  fund. 
The rev ised proposal reduced the  number o f  turn-back programs t o  
35, w i t h  a pro jec ted t o t a l  c o s t  o f  $30.6 b i l l i o n  f o r  s t a t e  
admin i s t ra t i on  o f  t he  programs. 
Federal ism .t r u s t  fund. I n  order  t o  fund turn-back program 
a c t i v i t i e s ,  a $20.4 b i l l i o n  t r u s t  fund would be establ ished t o  provide 
a revenue source f o r  t he  s ta tes  t o  draw from. A summary o f  t he  f i s c a l  
aspects o f  t he  New Federal ism package are  as f o l  1 ows : 
Federal ism Program -- FY '84 Level 
( B i  11 ions o f  do1 1 ars )  
StateILocal Programs Revenue Sources 

and Costs Absorbed To Finance Them 

$ 8.1 AFDC Medicaid Saving 
$30.6 Turnback Federal ism Trust  Fund 
Programs ($11.6 Excise Taxes) 
I$ 8.8 General Revenues) 
$38.7 TOTAL $38.7 TOTAL 
An important  fea tu re  o f  the  t r u s t  fund i s  t h a t  federal  excise 
taxes w i l l  be gradua l ly  phased out, one per year i n  the  four-year 
per iod  from 1988 t o  1991, w i t h  the  s ta tes  g iven the  oppor tun i ty  t o  
assume vacated federa l  taxes. The fou r  federal  excise taxes and the  
proposed phase-out schedule i s :  
-- gasol ine tax, two cents vacated i n  1988; -- alcohol  tax, repealed i n  1989; - - telephone tax, repealed i n  1990; and 
-- tobacco tax, repealed i n  1991. 
The p o r t i o n  o f  t he  t r u s t  fund t h a t  i s  der ived from federal  
general revenues may cont inue t o  provide revenues t o  the  s ta tes  a f t e r  
1991. It has been proposed t h a t  t h i s  prospect be s tud ied by the  
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Re1 at ions,  which would r e p o r t  
back t o  Congress by 1986 w i t h  i t s  recommendations. 
Several fea tures  o f  t he  t r u s t  fund were rev ised i n  the  J u l y  d r a f t  
o f  the  proposal. Most s i g n i f i c a n t  among these were: t he  e l i m i n a t i o n  
o f  the  mandatory f i f t e e n  percent pass-through o f  a l l  federal  t r u s t  
funds t o  l o c a l  u n i t s  o f  government i n  favor  o f  a formula pass-through 
o f  funds f o r  s p e c i f i c  types o f  program services; and the  e l i m i n a t i o n  
o f  the w i n d f a l l  p r o f i t s  tax  on o i l  as a source o f  revenue f o r  the 
federal ism t r u s t  fund, based on the  f a c t  t h a t  i t  would n o t  provide a 
uni form source o f  revenue among the s ta tes  a f t e r  being vacated by the 
federal  government. 
A t  i t s  f i n a l  meeting on November 17, the committee approved a 
motion t o  i n s e r t  i n  i t s  r e p o r t  the fo l l ow ing  statement concerning 
perceived impacts o f  the new federa l  ism proposal : 
The comrni t t e e  acknowl edges the  d iverse  observat ions o f  
many o f  those on the  committee and many o f  those who 
t e s t i f i e d  before the  committee. Among the  more sal  l e n t  
observat ions: 
--	 The New Federal ism approach as present ly  s t ruc tu red  
w i l l  have a s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on the revenues 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  the  State o f  Colorado. 
--	 The New Federalism approach as present ly  s t ruc tu red  
w i l l  r equ i re  the  s ta tes  and l o c a l  governments t o  be 
a t t e n t i v e  t o  e q u i t y  concerns, p a r t i c u l a r l y  as they 
r e l a t e  t o  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  ava i l ab le  soc ia l  serv ice  
funds t o  low-income households. 
The committee acknowledges t h e  concerns expressed by many 
concerning problems associated w i t h  decentra l iza t ion  o f  
we1 f a r e  programs t o  each s t a t e  and the threshold l e v e l  o f  
federa l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  the  medicaid program. F ina l l y ,  t he  
committee wishes t o  express i t s  concern w i t h  the present 
s t r u c t u r e  o f  t he  t r u s t  fund. Serious quest ions must be 
responded t o  regarding the l e v e l  o f  program funds and 
extension o f  the t r u s t  fund. 
Need f o r  Continued Moni to r ing  of New Federalism I n i t i a t i v e  
During the in ter im,  the  committee discussed a number o f  issues 
r e l a t i n g  t o  the  i n i t i a t i v e  which could have been the  basis of 
recommendations t o  the  General Assembly. However, the  comni t t e e  chose 
t o  forego any recommendations on "New Federal ism" when i t  became known 
t h a t  t he  admin is t ra t ion 's  proposal would n o t  be submitted t o  Congress 
i n  1982 as expected. 
Because o f  the  s i g n i f i c a n t  nature o f  the impact the proposal 
holds i n  s to re  f o r  s ta te  and l o c a l  governments, and because o f  t he  
11 ke l  ihood f o r  renewed cons idera t ion  o f  the  proposal i n  the coming 
year, the  comnit tee became convinced t h a t  some capabi l  i t y  needs t o  be 
created i n  the General Assembly t o  monitor f u t u r e  developments i n  the  
debate over New Federal ism. The a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h i s  overs ight  group, 
whatever i t s  makeup, could be charged w i t h  the  dual assignment o f  
moni tor ing developments i n  the  implementation o f  block grant  programs 
as we l l  as the  New Federal ism. 
Block Grants 
Federal Leqi s l a t i o n  Author1 z ing  Block Grants 
I n  August o f  1981, President  Reagan signed i n t o  law the  "Omnibus 
Budget Reconc i l i a t i on  Act o f  1981" (PL 97-35). One of the  key 
features o f  the  a c t  was the  consol i d a t i o n  o f  a number o f  federal  
ca tegor i ca l  ( s p e c i f i c  purpose) programs i n t o  n ine  block grants. Block 
grants  are  genera l ly  de f ined as federal  funds d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  s t a t e  and 
l o c a l  e n t i t i e s  t o  accomplish a broad range o f  program goals, w i t h  a 
minimum o f  regu la tory  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  I n  proposing the  b lock g ran t  
concept s h o r t l y  a f t e r  h i s  inaugurat ion, the  President s ta ted t h a t  t he  
i n t e n t  o f  t h i s  i n i t i a t i v e  was t o  s i m p l i f y  and make more e f f i c i e n t  the  
federa l  g rant  process, t o  increase s t a t e  and l o c a l  government's 
f l e x i  b i l  it y  i n  the use o f  federal funds, and provide f o r  increased 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  a t  the  s t a t e  and l o c a l  leve ls .  
The sentiment t o  change the s t r u c t u r e  o f  federal  grants- in-a id 
has evolved from the  growing disenchantment w i t h  the  pro1 i f e r a t i o n  of 
ca tegor ica l  grants enacted by Congress. As c i t e d  i n  a recent r e p o r t  
from the Nat ional  Conference o f  State Legis latures,  t h i s  
disenchantment on the  p a r t  o f  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t i v e  bodies has grown o u t  
o f  several fac tors :  
--	 l a c k  o f  f l e x i  b i l  i t y  t o  t a i l o r  programs t o  l oca l  needs; 
--	 onerous bureaucrat ic  requirements o f  program admin is t ra t ion ;  
-- federal  government "1 u r ing "  s t a t e  arid l o c a l  government i n t o  
s t a r t i n g  programs by p rov id ing  100 percent federal  funding i n  the  
e a r l y  years, b u t  then adding s t a t e  match requirements l a t e r ;  
--	 increas ing ly ,  agency grantees were i n  the  p o s i t i o n  o f  being he ld  
accountable t o  Washington, D.C., more than t o  s t a t e  and l o c a l  
e lected o f f  i c i  a1 s; 
-- s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  found themsel ves by-passed by s t a t e  agencies; 
and 
-- l o c a l  governments were apply ing d i r e c t l y  t o  the federal  
government f o r  aid. 
Given the Pres ident 's  phi losophy o f  g rant ing  greater  recogn i t ion  
t o  s t a t e  and l o c a l  governments i n  the  federal  process, and the  
receptiveness o f  s t a t e  and l o c a l  governments t o  the  prospects fo r  
increased l o c a l  c o n t r o l  , the b lock g ran t  i n i t i a t i v e  appeared t o  of fer  
bene f i t s  t o  meet a v a r i e t y  o f  needs. 
I n  h i s  budget request f o r  f i s c a l  year 1981-82, the President  
recomnended the  consol i d a t i o n  o f  85 ca tegor ica l  g rant  programs i n t o  
seven b lock grants. The f i n a l  b lock g ran t  package t h a t  emerged from 
Congress, however, provided f o r  n ine  block grants which consol idated 
fewer programs than the  President  had envisioned.* The n ine  b lock 
grants are: 




Community Devel opment 

Elementary and Secondary Educat 1 on 

Maternal and C h i l d  Heal t h  Services 





Preventive Heal t h  and Heal t h  Services 

Social  Services 

* 	 There are numerous d iscrepancies i n  the number o f  ca tegor ica l  
programs a t t r i b u t e d  t o  block g ran t  consol idat ion.  The Executive 
O f f i c e  o f  the  President  c i t e s  57 programs. The Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relat ions (ACIR) a t t r i b u t e s  76 
programs t o  the  b lock grants, which they explained i s  based on 
data provided by the  O f f i c e  o f  Management and Budget (which i s  
s i t u a t e d  i n  the  Executive O f f i c e  o f  the  President).  The General 
Accounting O f f i c e  uses t h e  f i g u r e  o f  80 ca tegor ica l  programs i n  
the  b lock grants, though the background in format ion  provided on 
request on l y  inc ludes 76  programs, i d e n t i c a l  t o  the  l i s t  c i t e d  by 
ACIR. (See Apend ix  A f o r  a l i s t i n g  o f  the  b lock g ran t  programs 
c i t e d  by ACIR.  ! 
I n  the f o l l o w i n g  sect ions, several issues concerning the  b lock 
grants w i l l  be discussed, inc lud ing:  
--	 features  o f  the  n ine  block grants; 
--	 method by which b lock grants have been implemented i n  t h e  
state;  
--	 c r i t i c i s m s  o f  the  b lock grants; and 
--	 cons idera t ion  o f  t he  r o l e  o f  t he  General Assembly i n  t h e  
imp1 ementation o f  b l  ock g ran t  p rog ram i n  Colorado. 
Common prov is ions  i~the block grants. Throughout t h e  
reconc i l  i a t i o n  act,  var ious reauirements appear which are  common t o  
many o f  t he  block grants, though n o t  uni formly '  appl i cab le  t o  a l l  o f  
the  n ine  block grants. (Table 1 on pages 10 and 11 disp lays  the major 
features o f  the  b lock grants.) Fol lowing are several o f  the  more 
s i g n i f i c a n t  general fea tures  shared by the  block grants: 
seven block grants r e q u i r e  t h a t  s ta tes  make a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  
assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e i r  admin is t ra t ion ;  
fund t rans fe rs  are al lowed among f i v e  o f  t he  block grants; 
s t a t e  admin i s t ra t i ve  expense l i m i t s  e x i s t  i n  s i x  o f  t he  block 
grants, ranging from zero t o  twenty percent  o f  t he  federal 
funding a1 lotment; 
non-federal matching funds a re  requ i red  f o r  three o f  the 
b lock grants; 
a p o r t i o n  o f  the  funds are  earmarked f o r  c e r t a i n  serv ices i n  
s i x  o f  the  b lock grants; 
p rov is ions  f o r  mandatory s t a t e  pass-through o f  funds t o  l o c a l  
governments o r  n o n - p r o f i t  organizat ions appear i n  f i v e  o f  the  
b lock grants (some i n  the form o f  "earmarks"); and 
th ree b lock grants conta in  prov is ions  concerning "maintenance 
o f  e f f o r t "  (cont inuat ion  o f  funding o f  c e r t a i n  serv ices)  o r  
"nonsup 1 a n t i  ng" (rep1 acing s t a t e  do1 1 ars w i t h  federal  
do1 l a r s  .P 
Crosscut t i  ns provis ions.  Another fea tu re  o f  block grants which 
was brought o u t  i n  i n t e r i m  testimony was t h a t  o f  "c rosscut t ing"  
provisions. General ly, c rosscu t t i ng  prov is ions  are  admin i s t ra t i ve  
p re requ is i t es  o r  o ther  procedural o r  pol i c y  mandates imposed broadly 
on federal  g ran t  programs. Typical l y, references t o  c rosscu t t i ng  
prov is ions  do n o t  appear i n  the  s p e c i f i c  l e g i s l a t i o n  which author izes 
var ious federal  g rant  programs, bu t  r a t h e r  are  w r i t t e n  i n  a manner 
t h a t  they " c u t  across" a number o f  programs. 
Major Features d Block Grants Created or Altered by 
~ i a m m l a w  and Raranl lre H d t h  and Alsohol. Drug Abuse. 
Sacondaw Education Heatlh Senkea and Yantal Health 
1. Number of programs 1 discretionary granl 37 calegoricals 1 existing block (Health I 0  categoricals 
superseded (identified in (Budget Reconcilialion Incentive Gr in l  for Com- 
OMB's Cafalag o l  Federal Act also expanded exist- prohenslve Public Heailh 
Domesfic Assrslance) ing Communlly Develop- SeNiCOal and 6 
ment Block Grant by fold. categoricala 
in9 In 3 catagorlcalsl 
2. Fundtng level (m Old-$796 
mllllonsl: superseded (old) NOW-$952 
programs (eal FY 81 
obligations) and new pro- 
gram (Reagan FY 82 
appropriations request) 
3. 	 Nonladeral matching 10% by state il It elects None None None 
lo  channel (see "pass- 
through" below) 
4. AdmlnlstraUve costa- 	 50% 01 corns, not lo  Up m 20% 01 funds can be 10% o l  federal alblmenl 10% of ledoral allotment 
llmils on federal fundlng 	 exceed 2% of federal used lor alate operated pro- 
allotment grams and admlnlstraUon 
NO No 	 Yes. for FYa 1882-84 Yor, spec~lic amounts 
specific amounts 
States may not use lunda 	 Stales may not use lunds 
lor inpatient aarvices. 	 lor Inpatient services. 
cash payments. purchase 	 cash payments. purchase 
or Improvoment o l  prop- 	 or improvement o l  prop- 
perty. or federal matching 	 erty or federal matching 
7. Translerablllty 01 	 NO Up b 7% may be trans- Up to 7% may bo trans- 
funds 	 ferred for specllied health ferred for specilted health 
purposes purposes 
8. Maintenance of eflort 	 No Eapendrures mu l l  be at Federal lunds will be Federal lunds will be 
or non-supplant provislon 	 least 90% 01 level lor used lo  aupplemenl and used to supplement and 

second prlor FY Federal not supplant nonlederal not supplant nonfederal 

funds must supplement 

State uual!f~er as dis- 	 Slate must pass through at No "Earmarktng' includes 
lrlbulor o l  bloc6 granl 	 least 80% to local educa- mandaled lundmg in 
only If governor certilies 	 tion agencles on basis of FYs 82. 83, 84 o( com- 
that state will meet lour enrollment adjusted for munity heallh centers 
Specified conditions. number of higher cost federally funded in FY 80 
Otherwise. HUD makes chtldren 
distribution 




of Act: (1) Pubiicalion 

of proposed use report. 

(2) publlc hearing. 13) 





11 Other required stale 	 Yes but lor as long as Yes annually Yes. annually 
administralive procedures: 	 3 years and Secrelary 
a Application for grant 	 approves crlterla used lo 
d~str!bute lunds locally 
b. Assurances requlred In Adequate information to -Advlawy commlltee l o  -Crlterta to evaluate -Criteria to evaluaie 
application or other citliens on funds avail- slate education aqency performance performance 
statement, regarding: able, proposed activfties -8eamnlng .In FY 84 an- -Cooperallon wnth fed- -Cooperatton wth led- . 
-Public hearings nual evaluation of era1 lnvesligalions 
-Citizen partkipation program eneclweness -Idenlilication of 
in developmenl of appli- program need program need 
callon -Ma~nlenance 01 records -Ma~ntenance of records 
conlldenllallly conf~denl~al#ly 
c. "Sacretary may m t  No such provision No such provision Yes Yes 

prescribe the manner In 

which tho stele1 *I11 

comply" with assurawes 

d. Publlcatlon 01 Intended Yes Yes 





e. Publlc hearlngr 	 No such provision No such provislon By slate Ieg~slature By state lepislature 
I.Annual report and Annual audll. Performance Stale provldes inlormallon Yes 

annual Independent audll report required at llmes Secrelary requires far 

oet by Secretary 	 tlacal audll and evaluation 
01 ellectlveness 
9. "S.cr#av may not No such provlalon No such provision Yes 

aslabllsh ra~art ing re. 





12. Transillon prwlslon 	 Elfective 1011181 Ellactlve 10H162 In FY 1882. ladoral In FY 1982. federal 
agency administers exist- agency admlnislers exist- 
Ing calegorlcals unlll Ing categorlcals untll 
Source :  A d v i s o r y  C o m m i s s i o n  on state Is ready to assume state 1s ready to assume 
I n t c rgove rn rnen ta l  R e l a t i o n s  "The block grant Therealter, block granl Thereallar 
F i r s t  Ten Months:  rant-in-Aid, states must administer or states must admmlster or 
R e g u l a t o r y ,  and O t h e r  Changes1', lose funds lose lunds 

I n t e r o o v e r n n c n t a l  F e r s p e c t i v e  
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TABLE 1 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (PL 97-35) 
Maternal and CMd 
Heakh h r r l ces  
2 caleporicals 
13 state lor each 14 FY 83-20%. FY 84- 
Iedefal 33 113% 
None 	 Stale use o l  block granl 
lor adminiatralive costa 
pr0hlblt.d 
Yes. but no apecllic Yes. health cenlers fund- 
amounts ed In FY 82 musl pet same 
amount In FY 83. 
Slmllar to Preventive Only 5% o l  lunds may go 
Health and Health Ser- to certain communlly 
vcas block granl heallh centers 
See ' Earmarking Also 
any stale no1 subm~lt~ng 
eppllcatlon tor FY 83 84 
or not qualtlylng lor Its 
allotment has 11s allot- 
ment d~slrlbuied dwectly 
by HHS 
IApplcab~lnly under Yes 

rewew I l l811 

Yes, annually. and federal 
approval required 
-Faor method lor allotmg -Establ~shmenl of crm-
lunds gudtng heallh care terla to evaluate Ilscal. 
assessment and services managerlal cllnlcal 
assumg quaioty performance 
-Assurance lhal serwce -Stale agency s capab~l- 
charges 'ollow pubilc nly o l  managmg, deter- 
schedule are not Imposed mmmg needs, evaluallng 
on poor and are on sild- performance o l  CHCs 
mg scale 
-State agency coordlna- 
tlon wlth Medlcaid s 
early scraening and 
related programs 
NO such provhon 	 NO such provlslon 
NO such provision 	 By slate leg6slalure 




NO such prov~slon 	 Yes 
In  FY 1982 Iedaral EIIec~fve1011182 

agency admmslers emst- 

mg categortcals unlll 

slale 15 ready lo assume 

block grant Therealter 





1 exlstlng block (Social 
Services lor Low lncome 
and Public Assistance 




Yes, specific minimums 
Similar to Preventive 
Heallh and Heallh Ser- 
VICes block grant 
May transfer up lo  10% 
lor swc~loed health and 





NO such provmlon 
Yes 
Yes. at Ieasl every two 
years 
7 categoricals Icategorical 
None 	 None 
5% of federal allotment 	 Up to 10% 
Yes, at least 90% musl go No 
to localilies, nonprolils, sea- 
sonal larm worker groups. 
May not be used to pur- Similar to Communtty 
chase or lmprove land or Services, with 15% 
bulldinps, ercepl lor cer- iimlt on repalr ., 
lain energy-relaled home 
repalrs 
May trmsler up to 5% for May transfer up to 10% 
specllied Social serwce lor speci l ld soclal 
d Income security purposes and heallh services 
See 'Earmarking" 	 NO 
Yes. annually 
-Makeup o l  governing 
board of CAA or nonprol~t 
private agency 
-Prohibition 01 pol#t#cal 
a c l w t m  and transporta- 
tion to polls 
-Coordmat~on with emer- 
gency energy Intervention 
programs 
Yes. annually 
-Conduc' ol outreach 
ac~~v~ t l es  
-Coord~nat~on w~ lh  





-Provlslon of lalr admin- 
Islrat~vehearlnp for 
-aggrieved cla~mantr 
Yes. Governor requlred Yes. Governor requlred 
10 provide plan of how to prowde plan o l  how 
state P~OPOS~Ilo  carry stale PrOPOses to Carry 
out assurances on out assu~ances on 
applicat~on applicalion 
By stala legislature 	 BY stale lepislature 
Annual report io  publlc 	 Annual re~or t  o Dublic .. 
but not 10 lederal apency, but not lo  lederal agency, 
annual Independent audll blannial Independent 
audlt 
NO such provision ' 	 No such provision 
In FY 1982. HHS admmnts- Ellecllve 1011181 
lers erlsling categoricals 
untd slate IS ready lo  
assume block grant. There- 
alter. stales must admm- 
lsler or lose lunds 
On several occasions during the interim, crosscutting
requirements were referred to in the context of their applicability to 
block grants. I t  was found t h a t  a distinction was necessary between 
two different types of crosscutting provisions referred to from 
time-to-time -- those t h a t  appear in the reconcil iation act i t se l f ;  
and those general provisions of federal law or regulation which by 
their imp1 ication apply to the block grants. Following i s  a brief 
discussion of each of the crosscutting provisions. 
"Crosscutting" provisions in reconcil iation act. In the 
authorizing legislation (Title XVI I of the act ) ,  Congress included 
several provisions which were designed to ease the transition of the 
block grant programs from federal to s ta te  control. I t  was the intent 
of these provisions to address the concern expressed by many states 
t h a t ,  because of different 1egi slative schedules and budget cycles , 
the states would not be prepared to assume responsibility for the 
programs as of the beginning of the federal fiscal year (October 1, 
1981). Additional ly,  there was some concern in Congress that states 
would not provide sufficient public notice about their plans for block 
grant funds. Though there were provisions in most of the block grants 
concerning transition periods and public notice requirements, the 
so-cal led "crosscutting" requirements were ini t ial  ly incl uded in the 
act to apply across-the-board to all block grants. The final 
crosscutting language in the b i l l ,  according to A C I R ,  only made these 
provisions applicable to four of the block grants -- preventive 
heal t h ;  primary care; community services; and a1 coho1 , drug abuse, and 
mental health. (See item 10 on Table 1.) 
As included in Tit le  XVII of the act ,  the crosscutting provisions 
requ i re: 
--	 an annual report on the goal s and objectives, act ivi t ies to 
be supported, method for distributing funds under the block 
grant, and (starting in 1983) a description of how previous 
year's goals have been met; 
--	 that a pub1 ic hearing be held on the report (waived in the 
f i r s t  year), which publ ic hearings are the responsibility of 
the state legislature as indicated in item 11 (e)  of Table 1; 
--	 federal agencies t o  continue to administer categorical 
programs until the state verifies that i t  i s  ready to assume 
all  or part of a block grant; and 
--	 financial and compl iance audits to be performed every two 
years, with the states a1 lowed to fomulate their own audit 
procedures in 1ieu of federal ly mandated audit management 
practices. 
Other "crosscuttingl~ requirements. In  a recent report on block 
grant implementation in the states from the U.S. General Accounting 
off i ce (GAO ) , "crosscutting" was discussed in i t s  more general and 
conmonly used context. 
Crosscut t ing requiremen t s  are s ta tu tes  o r  
admin i s t ra t i ve  requirements which apply by t h e i r  terms t o  
a1 1  o r  several federal  assistance programs. Some o f  these 
requirements, such as nond iscr iminat ion  statutes,  are 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  the b lock  g ran t  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  b u t  
the a c t  and regu la t i ons  are s i l e n t  on a p p l i c a b i l i t y  and 
s t a t e  responsi b i l  it i e s  f o r  o the r  c rosscu t t i ng  
requirements. 21 
The GAO r e p o r t  c i t e s  a  1980 study by the  O f f i c e  o f  Management and 
Budget which i d e n t i f i e d  a t  l e a s t  59 such c rosscu t t i ng  requirements 
which are  imposed on federa l  assis tance a c t i v i t i e s  t o  a t t a i n  c e r t a i n  
nat iona l  po l i c ies ,  such as c i v i l  r i g h t s  and environmental p ro tec t ion .  
Some o f  these requirements are  c i t e d  i n  the reconc i l  i a t i o n  a c t  as 
being app l i cab le  t o  c e r t a i n  b lock grants, though no t  t o  others. 
As opposed t o  making an e x p l i c i t  determinat ion o f  the  
appl i c a b i l  ity  o f  c rosscu t t i ng  requ i  rements t o  the b lock grants federal  
agencies a t  t h i s  t ime are  addressing the issue se lec t i ve l y .  
Imp1 ementation o f  Block Grants i n  Colorado 
The e f f e c t i v e  dates vary as t o  the  time the  s ta tes  can assume 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the admin i s t ra t i on  o f  the  var ious b lock grants. 
Two programs -- the Social  Services Block Grant and Low-Income Home 
Energy Assistance Block Grant -- were automatical l y  t rans fe r red  t o  
s t a t e  governments on October 1, 1981, bypassing s t a t e  program 
acceptance. 
Ear l y  i n  the in ter im,  test imony was heard by the  committee 
concerning the  s t a t e ' s  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  implementing b lock grants i n  the  
f i r s t  year o f  t he  program. Shor t l y  a f t e r  the 1981 session convened, 
an ad hoc committee o f  the  General Assembly was appointed t o  moni tor  
t he  impact o f  federa l  budget changes i n  Colorado, i nc lud ing  the 
prospects f o r  change owi ng t o  the  then-proposed block g ran t  
i n i t i a t i v e .  The in format ion  requested o f  the  federal  government t o  
accura te ly  assess t h i s  impact was no t  forthcoming a t  the t ime the ad 
hoc committee concluded i t s  del  ibera t ions .  I n  t h e i r  report ,  submitted 
t o  the General Assembly i n  January, 1982, a recomendat ion was 
inc luded t h a t  federal  programs cont inue t o  be monitored and analyzed 
through the  regu la r  budget process. The recomendat ion was adopted 
and implemented by the  J o i n t  Budget Committee, and s t a f f  ana lys ts  have 
been d i rec ted  t o  c a r r y  out  t h i s  func t i on  on a  cont inu ing basis i n  
t h e i r  var ious areas o f  responsi b i  1  i ty. 
-2 1 United States General Accounting Of f ice ,  Ear ly  Observations on 
Block Grant Implementation, GAO/GGD 82-79, Washington, D.C., 
August 24, 1982, p. 42. 
Ear l y  b lock  g ran t  appl i ca t i ons .  Shor t l y  a f t e r  the au tho r i za t i on  
o f  tt ie b lock g ran t  program, the J o i n t  Budget Committee (JBC) 
contemplated making appl i c a t i o n  t o  the federal  government f o r  b lock  
grant  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  when i t  became aware o f  the need f o r  the  s t a t e  t o  
apply. The budget committee soon learned, however, t h a t  app l i ca t i ons  
had already been prepared and submitted by the  governor's o f f i c e .  
Because federal  guide1 ines were i n i t i a l l y  vague as t o  the in format ion  
s ta tes  were t o  provide i n  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  process, the committee 
monitored the s p e c i f i c  b lock g ran t  proposal s  being made on behal f o f  
the  s t a t e  by the  execut ive branch. 
The budget committee a l s o  sent  l e t t e r s  t o  members o f  Colorado's 
congressional de legat ion  and var ious federa l  o f f i c i a l s  s t a t i n g  the  
committee's hope tha t ,  i n  the  contex t  o f  the new r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
s t a t e  and federal  governments envisioned i n  the  President 's  block 
g ran t  i n i t i a t i v e ,  a  new oppor tun i t y  would be presented concerning the 
r o l e  o f  the  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e  i n  the  appropr ia t ion  o f  federa l  funds. 
Memorandum o f  understanding on b lock g ran t  appropr iat ion.  During 
the  tyme the  General Assembly was c o n s i d e r i m  the  s t a t e ' s  1982-83 
budget, t he  J o i n t  Budget " Committee e n t e r e i  i n t o  a  memorandum o f  
understanding w i t h  the governor concerning t h e  manner i n  which b lock  
grants  would be handled i n  the  1982 l ong b i l l .  F ive b lock grants were 
assumed by the  s t a t e  i n  the  f i r s t  year o f  the programs -- two 
au tomat i ca l l y  t rans fe r red  t o  the  s t a t e  by federa l  mandate ( soc ia l  
serv ices and low-income energy), and th ree assumed a t  the  d i s c r e t i o n  
o f  t he  s t a t e  (maternal and c h i l d  heal th;  p revent ive  health; and 
a1 coho1 , drug abuse, and mental hea l th )  . 
The memorandum o f  understanding was intended t o  provide a  
mutua l ly  agreeable method f o r  deal ing  s p e c i f i c a l l y  w i th  federa l  funds 
a1 located t o  the  s t a t e  under the b lock  grants. The opera t ive  language 
i n  the agreement was t h a t  the  b lock grant  funds were t o  be " t rea ted as 
i f  they were appropr iated" by the  General Assembly. Because o f  
l e g i s l a t o r s '  concern as t o  the  meaning o f  t h a t  " treatment" phrase, 
language was amended i n t o  the  headnote o f  the  long b i l l  which, i n  
e f f e c t ,  provided t h a t  b lock grant  funds were a c t u a l l y  appropriated. 
Despite the  governor 's e f f o r t s  t o  have i t  re ins ta ted,  the  long b i l l  
was passed by the  General Assembly w i thout  conta in ing  the  " t rea ted as 
i f  appropr iated" 1  anguage. 
Long b i l l  i tem veto. The governor subsequently exercised a  1  i n e  
i tem veto over the  language, and s ta ted i n  h i s  veto message: 
This headnote may pose p r a c t i c a l  problems f o r  those 
agencies rece iv ing  the  federal  funds, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  l i g h t  
o f  t he  cu r ren t  unce r ta in t y  i n  the federal  budget. The 
1  i m i t a t i o n  o f  expenditures on federal  funds i s  c l e a r l y  a  
v i o l a t i o n  o f  t he  Colorado Supreme Court 's  dec is ion  i n  
McManus v. Love and Anderson v.  Lamm which p r o h i b i t  the 
appropr ia t ion  o f  f e d e r a l x n d s  bv the  Leqis lature.  While I 
w i l l  ' d i r e c t  t he  departments t h a t  rece ive  these funds t o  
honor the i n t e n t  o f  the funding i n  the Long B i l l  pursuant t o  
our  agreement i n  the  Memorandum o f  Understanding on Federal -Funds signed on Apr 1982, e l i e v e  the  language 
contained i n  t h i s  hA:dn%.e was i;cl:ded p r i o r  t o  the  
Memorandum, and Icannot l e t  the  unconst i  t u t i o n a l  1 anyuage 
i n  t h i s  headnote stand. ?/ 
The General Assembly, i n  response t o  the  p a r t i a l  veto, author ized 
the  b r ing ing  o f  a c o u r t  a c t i o n  t o  contes t  the  a c t i o n  o f  the  governor. 
The remaining f o u r  b lock  grants n o t  implemented i n  the  f i r s t  year 
have subsequently been e i t h e r  assumed o r  app l ied  f o r  by the  state. 
The education b lock  g r a n t  became the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  the  Department 
o f  Education on Ju l y  1, 1982, and the  pr imary care b lock g ran t  became 
e f f e c t i v e  October 1, 1982, p rov id ing  d i r e c t  federa l  funding t o  
community hea l th  centers i n  the  state.  
Planning e f f o r t s  f o r  the  s t a t e ' s  implementation o f  the community 
development and comnuni t y  serv ices  b l  oc k grants were undertaken over 
the  past  year by the  Department o f  Local A f f a i r s ,  working w i t h  an 
advisory commi t t e e  o f  1 ocal government o f f i c i a l  s. The e f f o r t s  o f  t h i  s  
group were r e c e n t l y  concluded, and appl i c a t i o n s  submitted t o  the 
federal  government f o r  implementing these two programs i n  the  state.  
C r i t i c i s m s  o f  the  Block Grant .Program 
Several fea tures  o f  the  b lock  g r a n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  as i t  emerged 
from Congress have been the  sub jec t  o f  c r i t i c i s m ,  l a r g e l y  due t o  the  
f a c t  t h a t  the  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  a c t  provided the  s ta tes  w i t h  l ess  
d i s c r e t i o n  i n  the  use o f  b lock grant  funds than d i d  the  Reagan 
Admin is t ra t ion 's  o r i g i n a l  proposal. 
The Nat ional  Conference o f  State Leg is la tu res  p o i n t s  o u t  a number 
o f  areas where s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  have encountered problems w i t h  b lock 
uncer ta in ty  i n  federal  funding l e v e l  s; and 
grants:  A/ 
-- i n s u f f i c i e n t  lead t ime f o r  l e g i s l a t i v e  review and 
approp r ia t i on  o f  b lock grants; 
- - "s t r i ngs "  at tached t o  b lock grants; 
- - reduced funding 1 eve1 s; 
- - 
-- rede f in ing  the  fede ra l - s ta te  re la t i onsh ip .  
* 
ournal Colorado House o f  Representatives, May 10, 1982; p. 
-4/  NCSL, Block Grants: pp. 27-31. 
I n s u f f i c i e n t  l ead  t ime f o r  l e g i s l a t i v e  rev iew and 
a r o  r i a t i o n .  Six  . b l o c k  grants  were made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  s t a t e  
-n on October 1, 1981, t he  beginning o f  t he  federal  f i s c a l  
year. Most s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  were n o t  i n  session a t  t h a t  t ime and, 
i n  f a c t ,  were w e l l  i n t o  the  1982 f i s c a l  year. Fo r t y -s i x  s ta tes  begin 
t h e i r  f i s c a l  year  on J u l y  1; seven s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  w i t h  b ienn ia l  
sessions do n o t  convene again u n t i l  1983. Consequently, s t a t e  
l e g i s l a t i v e  involvement i n  t h e  f i r s t  round o f  s t a t e  admin i s t ra t i on  o f  
t h e  new b lock  grants  tended t o  be 1  i m i t e d  o r  nonexistent.  Th is  means 
t h a t  t he  door was open f o r  t he  governors t o  accept the  b lock grants  on 
beha l f  o f  t he  s t a t e s  and t o  take the  lead i n  b lock g ran t  
imp1 ementation. 
"S t r ings"  attached t o  b lock qrants. Block grants  were s o l d  t o  
the  s ta tes  as a  form o f  t l e x i b l e  federa l  a i d  w i t h  t h e  understanding 
t h a t  s ta tes  could d i s t r i b u t e  t h e  funds according t o  program p r i o r i t i e s  
s e t  by the  states. The f i n a l  vers ion  o f  t he  a c t  attached numerous 
s t r i n g s  t o  some o f  t h e  b locks -- e s s e n t i a l l y  ma in ta in ing  t h e i r  
ca tego r i ca l  nature. 
As an example o f  such " s t r i n g s "  t h r e e  b lock grants  r e q u i r e  a  
s t a t e  match which has been a  t y p i c a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  ca tego r i ca l  
grants. The match requirements d e t r a c t  from the  i n t e n t  of b lock  
grants  and c rea te  addl t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  ob l  i g a t i o n s  fo r  t he  states. 
The requirements a re  as fo l lows:  
--	 Maternal and C h i l d  Health: The s t a t e  match requirement i s  
t h ree  sevenths o f  t he  federa l  funding l e v e l .  
--	 Primary Care: I n  FY '83, the  s t a t e  match i s  20 percent  o f  
t he  federa l  funding l e v e l  and i n  FY '84, t h e  s t a t e  match i s  
33 percent. 
--	 Community Development: A s t a t e  match o f  10 percent  i s  
required. (This  match can be made w i t h  i n -k ind  
cont r ibu t ions . )  
Cuts i n  b lock g ran t  funding leve ls .  S ta te  government leaders  
o f f e r e d  t o  accept a 10 percent  across-the-board c u t  i n  b lock  g r a n t  
funding i n  r e t u r n  f o r  g r e a t l y  increased s t a t e  c o n t r o l  over- the  
a1 l o c a t i o n  o f  federa l  funds. It was reasoned t h a t  a  10 percent  c u t  
could be absorbed because o f  savings a r i s i n g  from a  reduct ion  i n  t he  
federa l  bureaucracy. 
B u t  s ta tes  r e a l  i zed  a 22.7 percent  rea l  reduc t ion  which meant 
c u t t i n g  i n t o  the  substance o f  t he  programs. Most s ta tes  are  c u r r e n t l y  
d e a l i n g  w i t h  budget reduc t ions  and revenue s h o r t f a l l s  and are  i n  no 
p o s i t i o n  t o  subsid ize programs t h a t  were o r i g i n a l l y  i n i t i a t e d  on the  
federal l e v e l  and are  now being s h i f t e d  t o  the  states. 
Uncertainty i n  federa l  funding 1  eve1 s. The President  and 
Congress a re  con t i nu ing  t o  t a l k  about f u r t h e r  reduct ions i n  b lock  
grant  funding. Uncer ta ln ty  about the amount, t im ing  and a v a i l a b i l i t y  
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o f  federal  funds make i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the s ta tes  t o  prepare t h e i r  own 
budgets. This unce r ta in ty  a t  t he  federa l  1 eve1 creates ser ious 
p lanning problems f o r  s t a t e  f i s c a l  o f f i c e r s  and forces them t o  
est imate what the  f i n a l  federa l  a i d  f i g u r e s  w i l l  be. For example, t he  
cyc le  w i l l  begin again t h i s  year  as most s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  complete 
t h e i r  FY '83 budget work before Congress releases the  federal  FY '83 
budget. 
Redefining the  federa l  - s t a t e  re1 a t i o n s h i  p. President Reagan's 
o r i g i n a l  o b j e c t i v e  i n  h i s  block g ran t  proposal was t o  create a new 
na t iona l  pub1 i c  p o l i c y  i n i t i a t i v e  which would a l l ow  s ta tes  t o  d i r e c t  
the a l l o c a t i o n  o f  federa l  a i d  t o  programs i d e n t i f i e d  by the  s ta tes  as 
essen t ia l  services. For the s ta tes  t o  accompl i s h  t h i s ,  funding 
f l e x i b i l i t y  i s  a c r i t i c a l  element. The block g ran t  program t h a t  
emerged from Congress f a i l e d  t o  provide t h i s  new par tnersh ip  r o l e  f o r  
s t a t e  governments. The federa l  government i n s i  sted on earmarking a 
l a r g e  percentage o f  t he  b lock  funds which 1 im i ted  the d i s c r e t i o n a r y  
powers t h a t  were t o  be t rans fe r red  t o  the  states. 
General Assembly's Rol e i n  B l oc k Grant Imp1 ementation 
The process o f  i n i t i a l l y  accepting r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the f i r s t  
round o f  b lock . g rants  was undertaken by the  governor 's o f f i c e .  The 
b l  ock grant  funds were subsequently appropr iated by the  General 
Assembly pursuant t o  the  memorandum o f  understanding as discussed on 
page 13. An important focus o f  committee d iscussion dur ing  the  
i n t e r i m  i s  the  fundamental quest ion o f  whether the  l e g i s l a t u r e  may 
apply fo r ,  accept, and appropr ia te  federal  funds i n  block g ran t  
programs, and t o  otherwi se provide f i n a n c i a l  and programmatic 
overs igh t  t o  the process. 
H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  attempts by the  General Assembly t o  ga in  conto l  
over appropr ia t ions  o f  federa l  funds have been unsuccessful. I n  the  
1971 long appropr ia t ions  b i l l ,  a p rov i s ion  was inc luded t h a t  any 
federal  o r  cash funds received by an agency could n o t  be expended 
w i thou t  f u r t h e r  l e g i s l a t i v e  appropr iat ion.  The governor vetoed t h a t  
provis ion,  and the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the  veto i n  the  case 
of MacManus v. Love (discussed be1 ow). 
The r u l i n g  i n  t h i s  case d i d  n o t  a f f e c t  federal  funds which 
r e q u i r e  a s t a t e  match, and as a r e s u l t  t he  General Assembly has re1 i e d  
on what i s  termed the  "Mu headnote language which appears i n  the long 
appropr ia t ions  b i l l  t o  c o n t r o l  general funds used t o  match f e d e r a l l y  
funded programs. The "MI1 headnote was designed t o  au tomat ical  1 y 
reduce the s t a t e  match should there  be a decrease o r  increase i n  
federal  funds. 21 
-51 Colorado O f f i ce o f  the  Sta te  Auditor.  Approval and Control o f  
Federal Funds i n  Colorado, Performance Audit, March, 1982: p. 13. 
Federal l e g i s l a t i o n  by-passes the  issue o f  l e g  i s 1  a t i v e  versus 
execut ive c o n t r o l  by r e f e r r i n g  t o  " the  state," w i thou t  d e f i n i n g  i t s  
meaning. I n  at tempt ing t o  p lace  the  issue o f  app rop r ia t i ng  federa l  
b lock  grants  i n  i t s  app rop r ia te  contex t  i n  Colorado, t he  committee 
heard test imony from Mr.  Douglas Brown, D i r e c t o r  o f  the L e g i s l a t i v e  
D r a f t i n g  O f f i ce :  
Whether t he  app rop r ia t i on  power extends t o  these 
federa l  funds i s ,  o f  course, a  quest ion o f  f i r s t  importance. 
MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo 218, 499 P2d 609 (1972), he ld  
tha t ,  wh i l e  the  Colorado l e g  i s 1  a t u r e  could appropr ia te  s t a t e  
moneys cond i t ioned on r e c e i p t  o f  federa l  funds, federal 
funds n o t  r e q u i r i n g  a s t a t e  match were n o t  sub jec t  t o  
appropr iat ion.  This  was because federa l  funds no t  connected 
w i t h  expendi ture o f  s t a t e  funds were l k u s t o d i a l "  i n  nature 
and t h e  o n l y  r o l e  the  execut ive  branch played w i t h  regard t o  
" cus tod ia l "  funds was t o  admin is te r  them. Since 
"admin i s t ra t i on "  i s  an execut ive  funct ion,  the  app rop r ia t i on  
o f  federa l  funds was the  exerc ise  o f  an execut ive f u n c t i o n  
by the  l e g i s l a t i v e  branch. I n  Colorado, our approach t o  
arguing t h i s  i ssue  has been t o  1  i m i t  the  MacManus case t o  
i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  fac ts .  MacManus i s  a  p e c u l i a r l y  s h o r t  and 
obtuse opin ion,  r e l y i n g  on Colorado a u t h o r i t y  o f  
quest ionable appl  i c a b i l  ity .  Second, MacManus has been 
round ly  c r i t i c i z e d  i n  t he  p e r i o d i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e  and i n  cases 
from o the r  j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,  p r i m a r i l y  because t h e  con t ro l  o f  
f ede ra l  funds by the  execut ive  branch i s  much more than an 
"admin i s t ra t i ve "  o r  ' cus tod ia l "  func t ion ,  and has r e s u l t e d  
i n  e ros ion  o f  the  power and meaning o f  t he  power t o  
appropr iate.  Thi rd,  t he  argument can be made t h a t  MacManus, 
which was decided i n  1972, i s  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  on a . 
h i s t o r i c a l  basis. I f  t h e  general purpose o f  t h e  b lock  g ran t  
l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  t o  d i v e s t  the federa l  government of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and i n v e s t  t h a t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t he  s t a t e  
government, t o  use MacManus as the c o n t r o l 1  i n g  precedent on 
t h e  quest ions o f  t  h  e  m  Assembly's power t o  appropr ia te  
b lock g ran t  funds would be t o  ignore  the  basic  purpose o f  
t h e  b lock  g ran t  l e g i s l a t i o n .  
The general consensus appears t o  be t h a t  the  " r u l e s  o f  t he  gamen 
may be changing. The new b lock  grants  appear t o  be o f f e r e d  i n  a 
manner which removes any quest ion  as t o  the funds being "cus tod ia l  i n  
nature. Furthermore, test imony before t h e  committee suggested t h a t  
the federa l  government intended t o  be neu t ra l  on t h e  issue o f  how a 
s t a t e  handles the  app rop r ia t i on  and disbursement o f  b lock g ran t  funds. 
The March 1982 a u d i t o r ' s  r e p o r t  s ta tes :  
The task  fo r  s t a t e  and l o c a l  governments admln ls te r lny  
t h e  new b lock  programs w i l l  n o t  be easy because the  s t a t e  
w i l l  now have fewer federa l  funds t o  handle Increased 
responsi b i l  l ty. A1 though these b lock  grants  do no t  p rov lde  
the  amount o f  f l e x l b l l l t y  t h a t  e i t h e r  t h e  President  o r  t h e  
s ta tes  requested, they do represent  a  change i n  the Federal 
Government's a t t i t u d e  toward, s t a t e  1  eg i  s l a t  i v e  approval and 
con t ro l  o f  federa l  funds. I n  the  past, b lock grants... 
provided l i t t l e  room f o r  l e g i s l a t i v e  i npu t  except when the 
federal  funds diminished and the  State was required t o  
pick-up the  programs. The new block grants do no t  conta in  
such language. Although the  Federal Government has n o t  
provided s p e c i f i c  d i r e c t i o n  t o  the  s ta tes  on which branch o f  
s t a t e  government should be responsib le f o r  the  b lock grants, 
i t  has given the  s ta tes  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  e i t h e r  
a l l o c a t i n g  the  reduct ion  i n  funding o r  e lse  p r i o r i t i z i n g  
funding requests t o  meet lower program levels.  This 
respons ib i l i t y  i s  l e g i t i m a t e l y  a  l e g i s l a t i v e  funct ion.  A/ 
The audi t o r ' s  r e p o r t  concl uded: 
The Leg is la tu re  should asse r t  i t s  a u t h o r i t y  t o  
appropr la te  a l l  o r  selected federal  funds such as b lock 
grants  on the  assumption t h a t  Congressional ac t ions  and 
o the r  c o u r t  r u l i n g s  subsequent t o  MacManus v. Love have 
expanded l e g i s l a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  i n  th3s area. -71 
I n  1982, the  General Assembly again attempted t o  con t ro l  federa l  
funds by i n c l  uding prov is ions  appropr ia t ing  b lock  grants. That 
p rov i s ion  was vetoed by the  governor and t h e  General Assembly has 
agreed t o  i n i t i a t e  a  l ega l  chal lenge thereon. 
A c t i v i t y  i n  Other States Concern1 ng Federal Funds 
Act ions o f  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  concerning federa l  funds. I n  it s  
recent  r e p o r t  concerning b lock grants and s t a t e  appropr ia t ion  o f  
federal  funds, the  National Conference o f  S ta te  Legi s l  a tures 
concl uded : 
A s i g n i f i c a n t  fea tu re  o f  b lock grants i s  t h a t  s t a t e  
leg1 s la tu res  have a  new oppor tun i t y  t o  appropr late a l l  
federal  funds. Some s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  a1 ready had i n  p lace 
a mechanism approp r ia t i ng  federa l  funds and b lock g ran t  
imp1 ementation was e a s i l y  accommodated i n t o  t h i s  process. 
Other s ta tes  are us ing the  oppor tun i ty  presented by b lock 
grants t o  take t h e  f i r s t  s tep i n  developing overs igh t  o f  
federa l  funds.. ..-8 1  
Ib id .  pa 9-6. 
2 
7J Ib id .  p. 18. 
NCSL. Block Grants, p.8. 
An NCSL r e p o r t  provides evidence o f  the  t rend toward s t a t e  
1  eg is l  a  tures seeking increased con t ro l  over federal  funds : 
I n  1980, ten  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  made s p e c i f i c  sum (as 
opposed t o  open-ended o r  automatic) appropr iat ions of 
federal  funds i n  t h e i r  appropr iat ions b i l l ( s )  and had 
approval /d i  sapproval a u t h o r i t y  over e i t h e r  federal  g rant  
app l i ca t ions  o r  the i n t e r i m  r e c e i p t  o f  federal  funds; by 
Ju ly  1982, 15 s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  exercised such binding 
a u t h o r i t y  over a l l  federa l  funds and f i v e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  
exercised b ind ing a u t h o r i t y  over block grant  funds... I n  
1980, 24 l e g i s l a t u r e s  had l i t t l e  o r  no involvement i n  the 
overs ight  o f  federal  funds; by May 1982, only e i g h t  could be 
sa id  t o  have 1  i t t l e  o r  no involvement. !3J 
I n  t h e i r  November, 1981 survey o f  a l l  50 states, NCSL found t h a t  
a number o f  mechanisms are  i n  place t o  con t ro l  the expenditure o f  
block grant  funds. They found t h a t  23 s ta tes  had i n s t i t u t e d  new o r  
specia l  l e g  i s 1  a t i v e  procedures t o  deal w i  t h  b l  ock grants. Most 
commonly found was l e g i s l a t i o n  r e q u i r i n g  some method o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  
"s ign-o f f "  as a  p re requ is i te  t o  the  expenditure o f  block grant  funds. 
(Attached as Appendix B i s  a  state-by-state sumnary o f  recent  act ions 
concerning l e g  i s 1  a t i v e  con t ro l  o f  federal  funds. ) 
Recent case law -concerning con t ro l  o f  federal  funds. As was 
pointed out  on several occasions dur ing i n t e r i m  testimony, the  federal  
b l  ock grant  1  eg i  s l a t  i o n  (concerning- responsi b i 1  i t y  - f o r  program 
imp1 ementation) r e f e r r e d  on ly  t o  " the  state. Congress, therefore, 
deferred t o  the  s ta tes  t o  make a determinat ion o f  the  appropr iate 
r o l e s  f o r  each branch and a1 lowing them t o  r e l y  on t h e i r  own law and 
prac t ices  t o  s o r t  out  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  each. This " s o r t i n g  
out "  process has resu l ted  i n  a  number o f  recent  c o u r t  cases concerning 
1  egi  s l a t i v e  versus execut ive prerogat ives i n  the  cont ro l  o f  federal  
funds (Colorado among them). 
These c o u r t  cases have genera l ly  focused on three aspects o f  
federal  fund con t ro l  i n  the states:  
-- l e g  i s 1  a t i v e  appropr ia t ion  o f  federal  funds general l y ;  -- 1 e g i s l a t i v e  appropr ia t ion  o f  federal  block grant  funds 
specific a l l  y  ; and-- l e g i s l a t i v e  budget con t ro l  dur ing the inter im. -10/ 
Appendix C contains a  d iscussion o f  these issues, based on a  review of 
recent  re1 evant c o u r t  decis ions around the country. 
-9/ National Conference of State Legi s l  atures, Strengthening Legi s l  a- 
t i v e  Oversi t e  of Federal Funds: Problems, Issues and Approaches, 
L e g i s l a t i v e  f lnance Paper #22, Denver, July, 1982; p. 9. 
-10/ Ib id .  p. 32. 
IMPLICATIONS OF NEW FEDERALISM 

FOR STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP 

While i t  i s  unclear  what form "New Federal ism" may take, i t  i s  
l i k e l y  t h a t  the  s t a t e  i s  going t o  p lay  a  r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  r o l e  i n  
the  f u t u r e  f i nanc ing  o f  government programs. Local governments --
counties, m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ,  school d i s t r i c t s ,  and specia l  d i s t r i c t s  --
may a1 so p l  ay d i f f e r e n t  programma t i c  r o l  es. "New Federal ism" o f f e r s  
an oppor tun i t y  t o  c l e a r  up ex1 s t i  ng d i  sorganized federal  - s ta te - loca l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and i t  o f f e r s  the  s t a t e  an oppor tun i ty  t o  b u i l d  a new 
f i n a n c i a l  and s t r u c t u r a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  s t a t e  and l o c a l  
e n t i t i e s  on a  wide range of issues. This would i nvo lve  a  r e d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  t h e  r o l e s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  both the  s t a t e  and l o c a l  
governments. 
Status o f  Counties 
T r a d i t i o n a l ly,  county government nat ionwide and i n  Colorado has 
been considered an arm of s t a t e  government. This t r a d i t i o n a l  l e g a l  
view may be summarized as fo l lows:  
A county i s  created by the l e g i s l a t u r e  w i thou t  reference t o  
the w i l l  o f  i t s  inhabi tants.  It has no power o f  l o c a l  
government, o r  independent a u t h o r i t y  o f  any k i n d  whatever. 
I t s  o f f i c e r s ,  al though e lec ted by i t s  people, a re  v i r t u a l l y  
o f f i c e r s  o f  the  s ta te ,  and a re  charged w i t h  the  
admin i s t ra t i on  and execution o f  t he  laws o f  the state. It 
i s  merely a  subd iv is ion  o f  the  s t a t e  f o r  the purposes o f  
s t a t e  government. It i s  noth ing more than an agency o f  t he  
s t a t e  i n  the  general admin i s t ra t i on  o f  the s t a t e  policy... 
(Stermer v. La P la ta  County, 5  Colo. App. 379, 1895.) 
T r a d i t i o n a l  and changing county funct ions.  T rad i t i ona l  county 
sovernment func t ions  are senera l l y  admin i s t ra t i ve  serv ices t h a t  a r e  
mandated t o  count ies  by s t a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n  o r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  provis ion.  
A 1975 survey conducted by the J o i n t  Data Center o f  the  Nat ional  
Associat ion o f  Counties (NACo) and the In te rna t iona l  City Management 
Associat ion (ICMA) examined county func t ions  nat ionwide and found t h a t  
a  very h igh  percentage o f  t he  count ies surveyed provided essent ia l ,  
" t r a d i  t i o n a l "  serv ices requ i red  statewide: property tax  assessment 
and c o l l e c t i o n ,  j u d i c i a l  functions, road maintenance, de tent ion  
f a c i l it i e s ,  e lec t ions ,  pol  i c e  pa t ro l ,  and maintenance o f  1  and records. 
Counties i n  Colorado have been delegated powers and du t ies  by the 
General Assembly which genera l l y  r e f 1  e c t  the  na t iona l  s i  tuat ion,  y e t  
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  powers o f  county government are being expanded t o  
inc l  ude municipal services. Increases i n  popul a t i o n  densi ty  and 
popu la t ion  m ig ra t i on  t o  the  suburbs have resu l ted  i n  a  v a r i e t y  o f  new 
se rv i ce  needs. The 1975 NACo survey showed t h a t  t he  greates t  increase 
i n  urban-type serv ices provided by the  county are  i n  the  areas o f  
so l  i d  waste c o l l e c t i o n  and disposal,  i n d u s t r i a l  development, 
subd iv is ion  con t ro l  , and mass t r a n s i  t. 
Status o f  Municipal it i e s  
C i t i e s  are  created by law p a r t l y  as the  agents o f  the  s t a t e  b u t  
c h i e f l y  t o  administer  t o  the l o c a l  a f f a i r s  o f  the incorporated 
t e r r i t o r y .  11/ A c i t y  o r  town: 
...i s  an agent o f  t he  s t a t e  i n  i t s  government; b u t  i t s  
pr imary purpose i s  the  admin i s t ra t i on  o f  i t s  own i n t e r n a l  
a f fa i rs .  It i s  a community invested w i t h  pecu l i a r  func t ions  
fo r  the b e n e f i t  of i t s  own c i t i zens .  It possess a l o c a l  
government o f  i t s  own, w i t h  executive, 1 egis1 a t ive ,  and 
j u d i c i a l  branches. It can enact and enforce ordinances, 
having the  fo rce  o f  laws, f o r  the  regu la t i on  o f  i t s  domestic 
concerns and t h e  preservat ion  o f  i t s  peace.. .. The character  
o f  a municipal i ty ,  w i t h  i t s  accompanying du t ies  and burdens, 
i s  assumed v o l u n t a r i l y  (Sterner  v. La P la ta  County, 5 Colo. 
App. 379, 1895). 
General ly  speaking, Colorado has two types o f  municipal it i e s  --
s t a t u t o r y  c i t i e s  and towns, and home r u l e  c i t i e s .  
S ta tu to ry  c i t i e s  and towns are  the  creatures o f  s ta tu te ;  they can 
exerc ise  on ly  such powers as are expressly conferred upon them o r  
e x i s t  by necessary imp1 i c a t i o n  (Kennedy v. The People, 9 Colo. App. 
490). Home r u l e  c i t i e s ,  however, are granted every power possessed by 
t h e  General Assembly i n  pu re l y  l o c a l  matters. 
Municipal funct ions. Ac t iva ted by t h e  des i re  t o  exerc ise greater  
c o n t r o l  over t h e i r  own community a f f a i r s ,  and w i t h i n  the  l i m i t a t i o n s  
o f  a u t h o r i t y  granted by the  s t a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  and l e g i s l a t u r e ,  
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  are  invo lved i n  the widest  range o f  serv ices and 
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  any type o f  l o c a l  government. Moreover, they are f a r  
and away the  leaders i n  terms o f  the  number o f  func t ions  i n  which they 
have the  greates t  expendi ture share. Nat iona l ly ,  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  i n  
1977 dominated ' local  d i r e c t  expenditure i n  pol ice, f i r e  pro tec t ion ,  
sewerage, o ther  san i ta t ion ,  parks and recreat ion,  housinglurban 
renewal , a i r  t ranspor t  f a c i l  it i e s ,  park ing f a c i l  i t i e s  and 1ibrar ies .  
This dominance extended t o  nonmetropol i tan areas except f o r  t he  
highway func t i on  where count ies were the  pr imary providers. 
-11/ John C. Banks, Colorado Law o f  C i t i e s  and Counties, 2nd Ed., 
1971, page 14. 
Nat iona l ly ,  municipal func t iona l  preeminence was n o t  as emphatic 
i n  1977 as i t  had been ten  years e a r l i e r .  The municipal share s l ipped 
i n  h igher education, hosp i ta l  s, heal th,  pol  ice, f i r e  pro tec t ion ,  
sewerage, o ther  san i ta t ion ,  parks and recreat ion ,  correct ions,  and 
1 ib ra r ies .  The s h i f t  i n  the share o f  expenditures f o r  these services 
was mainly toward the counties, but  a l so  impacted specia l  
d i s t r i c t s .  12/ 
E f f e c t  o f  Federal Pol i c i e s  and Programs on Local Governments 
H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  there  has been a strong sentiment f o r  l o c a l  
self-government i n  Colorado. A t  the same time, i t  i s  o f t e n  claimed 
t h a t  much o f  the  funct iona l  and s t r u c t u r a l  growth o f  l o c a l  governments 
has resu l ted  no t  from l o c a l  o r  s t a t e  i n i t i a t i v e s  bu t  from federal 
programs. For example, David R. Beam noted: 
Beginning i n  the mid-1960s, and more notably dur ing 
the  1970s, the federal  regu la to ry  presence has s p i l l e d  over 
from the t r a d i t i o n a l  economic sphere t o  inc lude the na t ion ' s  
states, c i t i e s ,  counties, school d i s t r i c t s ,  col leges, and 
o the r  pub l i c  j u r i s d i c t i o n s .  What was q u i t e  unthinkable (and 
seemingly p o l i t i c a l l y  impossible) a few decades ago has both 
been thought o f  and come t o  pass. 
Much, though n o t  a l l ,  o f  t he  "new soc ia l  regu la t ion "  
fa1 1 s i n t o  t h i s  intergovernmental category. Though c e r t a i n  
programs remain whol ly  nat iona l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  the s ta tes  
and l o c a l  i t i e s  have been conscr ipted i n t o  the b a t t l e s  
against  p o l l u t i o n  and f o r  c i v i l  r i gh ts .  I n  some areas, they 
have been charged w i t h  regu la t ing  the conduct o f  p r i v a t e  
business f i rms. I n  others, they have been obl  iged t o  remedy 
perceived shortcomings o f  t h e i r  own. 13/ 
Examples o f  such federa l  programs in c l  ude: the Highway 
B e a u t i f i c a t i o n  Act; Environmental Pol i c y  Act; Occupational Safety and 
Heal t h  Act; Federal Water Pol 1 u t i o n  Control Act; Safe Dr ink ing Water 
Act; Comprehensive Empl oyment and Tra in ing Act; and others. 
12/ 	Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relat ions, Sta te  and 
- Local Roles i n  the Federal System, Comnission Repor-
bashington, D.C., A p r i l ,  1982; p. 242 
13/ 	 David R. Beam, "Washington's Regulat ion o f  States and Loca l i t i es :  
Or ig ins  and Issues", Intergovernmental Perspectives, Summer 1981, 
Vol . 7, No. 3, page 9. 
As these programs were enacted, federal  funding t o  the  state,  t o  
the  s t a t e  as a d i r e c t  pass-through t o  l o c a l  governments, t o  l o c a l  
governments , and t o  l o c a l  non-govermnen t a l  ent it i e s  increased 
substant \a l l y .  I n  f i s c a l  year  1960, federal  g rants  c o n s t i t u t e d  14.7 
- @R2Wi? &fa??state and l o c a l  expenditures; i n  f i s c a l  year 1979, they 
had r i s e n  t o  25.6 percent. 141 
This t rend may be revers ing.  As noted ea r l  i e r  i n  the  d iscussion 
of federal program changes, a retrenchment i s  occur r ing  i n  the  
domestic pol l c l e s  o f  t h e  federal  government. These changing federal  
p o l i c i e s  need t o  be considered by the  General Assembly. 
b The f i n a l  r e p o r t  of t he  Colorado Commission on Sta te  and Local 
Government Finance states: 151 
Overal l  federal  assis tance t o  Colorado i s  decl i n i n g  , 
and much o f  the  burden o f  t h a t  dec l i ne  i s  f a l l i n g  t o  l o c a l  
governments and 1 ocal se rv i ce  providers. Proposal s t o  
decategori  ze federal  programs and create  more state-1 ocal 
f l e x i b i l i t y  -- e i t h e r  i n  the  form o f  b lock grants  o r  "new 
federa l  ism" -- w i l l  c h a l l  enge s t a t e  and l o c a l  cooperation. 
As t o t a l  f i n a n c i a l  resources are  reduced and f i n a n c i a l  
. r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  are s h i f t e d  back t o  s t a t e  and l o c a l  
government, harder choices are  on the  horizon.. . 
Federal funding t o  s t a t e  and l o c a l  governments i n  
Colorado grew by about 4% between FY 1980 and FY 1981, 
increasing from $1.0 b i l l i o n  t o  $1.04 b i l l i o n .  But i n  FY 
1982 both s t a t e  and l o c a l  governments experienced l a r g e  cu ts  
as federal  funds decreased from $1.04 b i l l i o n  t o  $887 
m i l  1 ion. This $1 52 m i l  1 i o n  reduct ion  represented an actual  
funding c u t  o f  14.6%. When adjusted f o r  i n f l a t i o n  (by 
p r o j e c t i n g  the  resources necessary t o  main ta in  l e v e l  o f  
serv ice  provided i n  FY 1981), t he  cu r ren t  serv ice  reduct ion  
i n  FY 1982 was $226.3 m i l  1 ion. The t a b l e  below shows these 
changes i n  federal  funds coming i n t o  Colorado between FY 
1980 and FY 1982. 
-141 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Re1 at ions, Federal 
In f luence on State and Local Roles i n  the  Federal 
tommission Report A-89, Nov. 1981, page 1. 
l5J 	 Colorado Conmission on State and Local Government Finance. F ina l  
Report, Volume I,August 1982, pa  55. 
FEDERAL FUNDING TO STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS I N  COLORADO 
( $  Thousands) 
FY 1982 
Major Local Proy rams $334,240 $308,226 $200,205 
Major State Programs 616,438 677,600 638,854 
Other Programs 49,094 52,276 47,528 
TOTAL $999,772 $1,038,102 $886,587 
Effect of 1981 Federal Leg is la t ion  on State-Local Government Re1 at ionsh i  p 
The b n i  bus Budget Reconcil i a t i o n  Act o f  1981 consol idated 
seventy-six categor ical  programs and two ear l  i e r  b l  ock grants i n t o  
nine new o r  revised block grant programs. Funding leve ls  f o r  most o f  
the programs were reduced. Whi 1 e many o f  the superseded categorical 
programs involved a d i r e c t  federal- local  re la t ionsh ip ,  a l l  nine o f  the 
new block grant programs ta rge t  the s ta te  as the primary grant 
r ec i  pient. Furthermore, the President 's "New Federal ism" proposals 
suggest a much stronger s ta te  r o l  e and a correspondingly greater 
reduction i n  the ex1 s t ing  federal -1 ocal re1 at ionship. 
...Whereas many o f  the superseded categor icals had involved 
a federal- local  re la t ionsh ip ,  a l l  nine o f  the new programs 
are directed t o  the states. The states have wide l a t i t u d e  
i n  a l loca t ion  decisions; only two o f  the block grants car ry  
passthrough guarantees f o r  the bene f i t  o f  1 ocal governments, 
a1 though three others requi re  earmarkings t ha t  help protect  
l oca l  funding f o r  a t  l e a s t  a l i m i t e d  period. 
Decentral izat ion under the New Federalism means t ha t  states 
have more d isc re t ion  i n  spending the federal funds they 
receive and t h a t  they have greater program responsi b i l  i ty, 
but  the budget cuts mean tha t  there are fewer federal 
do l l a r s  ava i lab le  and greater uncertainty as t o  who w i l l  
receive them and how they w i  11 be used. l6J 
Not mentioned above, but o f  a d e f i n i t e  concern, i s  the f ac t  t h a t  
federal program funds o f ten  by-pass both the s ta te  and i t s  loca l  
governments. Such programs provide d i r e c t  payments t o  loca l  
non-prof i t  corporations and ind iv idua l  s. As i n  the case o f  loca l  
governments, however, t h i s  d i r e c t  federal t o  non-profi  t re1 at ionsh i  p 
may change as a r e s u l t  o f  the 1981 block grants and future federal 
proposals. I n  e f fec t  the s ta te  may become the primary rec ip ien t  of 
these funds. For example, federal funds f o r  community mental heal t h  
l6J 	 Jean Lawson and Carl W. Stefnberg, "'Reba1 anced Federal ism: ' The 
State 's Role and Response'', Intergovernmental Perspective, ACIR, 
Vol . 8, No. 1, Winder, 1982, pa 30. 
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centers have genera l l y  gone d i r e c t l y  t o  these centers. Most of these 
grants have been merged i n t o  the alcohol,  drug abuse and mental hea l th  
services b lock grant.  
D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  FY 1982 Federal Funds 
Federal d i s t r i b u t i o n s  i n  Colorado were analyzed by the Commission 
on State and Local Government Finance. The c o m i s s i o n  noted t h a t  o f  
the t o t a l  funds t h a t  were a1 located t o  the s t a t e  i n  f i s c a l  1982, $366 
m i l  1 i o n  (41%) e i t h e r  f lowed d i r e c t l y  t o  a l o c a l  government o r  t o  a 
non-governmental serv ice  provider. F i  f t y - e i g h t  percent of t h i s  money 
was sent d i r e c t l y  from the federal  government t o  the l o c a l  leve l .  
Forty- two percent passed through the state. The f o l l  owing tab1 e shows 
s i x  major d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  paths by which federal  funds a r r i v e  a t  t h e i r  
eventual dest inat ion.  
PATTERNS OF FEDERAL FUNDS DISTRIBUTION 
Percent 
O f  Total 
Federal Funds 
( $  Thousandsr 
Federal 
Funds * Recip ient  
34% t o  State 
12% through State t o  Local 
government 
5% through State t o  non-govern-
mental serv ice prov ider  
2 5% through State t o  i nd iv idua l  
20% d i r e c t  t o  Local government 
4% d i r e c t  t o  non-governmen t a l  
serv ice  prov ider  
100% 	 TOTAL Federal $ t o  Colorado i n  
FY 1982 
* 	 Does n o t  inc lude Medicaid o r  Social Secur i ty  benef i t  
payments... l7J 
The incorpora t ion  of funds t h a t  t r a d i t i o n a l  l y  have gone d i r e c t l y  
( o r  passed-through) t o  1 ocal governments and non-prof it serv ice  
providers i n t o  b lock grants may provide the s t a t e  w i t h  a means t o  
b e t t e r  handle some on-going problems. I n  d iscussing the long-standing 
problem o f  federal  a i d  which provldes "seed" money f o r  program 
implementation, the  Colorado s t a t e  aud i to r ' s  March 1982 performance 
a u d i t  on approyal and con t ro l  o f  federal  funds contained the 
f o l  lowing: 
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A1 though the  Sta te  Cons t i t u t i on  g ives  the  Leg is la tu re  
the power and a u t h o r i t y  t o  appropr ia te  s t a t e  funds 
( D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Powers, A r t i c l e  111, Sect ion 11), the  
Federal Government s e t  up 22 catchment areas ( d i v i s i o n s )  o f  
t he  State and worked w i t h  l o c a l  organizat ions i n  these areas 
t o  se t  up community mental hea l th  centers. The Federal 
Government provided p r o j e c t  s t a f f i n g  and cons t ruc t i on  grants 
f o r  these centers but  f a i l e d  t o  g i ve  the State veto power 
over any federa l  funds. Most o f  these federal  grants were 
"seed" money o r  c o s t  assumption grants which requ i red  t h a t  
e i  t h e r  the Sta te  o r  l o c a l  govenments assume the costs o f  the  
centers once the federa l  funds declined. According t o  
personnel a t  t he  D i v i s i o n  o f  Mental Health, the  State 
Leg is la tu re  was no t  t o l d  t h a t  i t  would be asked t o  rep lace 
federa l  d o l l a r s  w i t h  general funds f o r  a l l  22 mental hea l th  
centers. However, once the  Leg is la tu re  had se t  precedent by 
funding s i x  centers whose federal  funds had declined, the  
o the r  centers expected s i m i l a r  treatment. As a  r e s u l t ,  the 
S ta te ' s  commitment has grown from $45,705 f o r  F isca l  Year 
1957-58 t o  $22,850,170 i n  F i sca l  Year 1981-82... l8/ 
The r e s u l t s  o f  these changes i n  methods o f  d i s t r i b u t i n g  federa l  
funds under b lock  grants w i l l  compel the  s t a t e  t o  assume more o f  a 
r o l e  as a  d i s t r i b u t o r  o f  moneys. Add i t i ona l l y ,  as federa l  funds a re  
reduced, the  s t a t e  w i l l  be asked t o  provide replacement funds. I n  
d iscussing t h i s  changing ro le ,  one author ra i ses  the  f o l l o w i n g  
question: 
While i t  i s  f a r  too  e a r l y  t o  t e l l  how w e l l  s ta tes  w i l l  
perform, there  i s  some concern t h a t  whatever f l e x i b i l i t y  i s  
provided by the  new b lock  grants may never reach the  l o c a l  
l eve l .  One o f  l o c a l  o f f i c i a l s '  g reates t  f ea rs  i s  t h a t  
s ta tes  w i l l  admin is ter  the  new b lock  grants  much l i k e  
ca tegor ica ls .  I f  so, l o c a l it i e s  w i l l  rece ive  fewer s t a t e  
and federa l  do1 l a r s  and those do1 l a r s  may we1 1  be t i e d  up 
w i t h  more s t a t e  s t r i ngs .  
A second source o f  p o t e n t i a l  c o n f l i c t  between the  
s ta tes  and t h e i r  1  ocal governments stems from s ta te-  imposed 
c o n s t r a i n t s  placed upon l o c a l  i t i e s '  a b i l i t y  t o  r a i s e  
revenue. If l o c a l i t i e s  are hampered by tax  1  ids, 
expendi ture 1i m i t s  , debt 1  im i ta t i ons ,  and o r  f i x e d  
boundaries t h a t  handicap t h e  c i t i e s  from expanding t h e i r  
t e r r i t o r i e s  i n  order  t o  draw upon the  more a f f l u e n t  suburban 
f i s c a l  base, then i t  w i l l  be even more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  them t o  
deal w i t h  t h e  c u r r e n t  f i s c a l  crunch o r  t o  meet b lock  g r a n t  
matching requirements imposed by the  states. A r e l a t e d  area 
o f  disagreement i nvo l ves  s t a t e  mandates which r e q u i r e  
c e r t a i n  ac t ions  by 1 ocal governments w i thou t  p rov id ing  funds 
t o  cover the c o s t  of c a r r y i n g  them out.. .l9/ 
Comnittee Findinqs -- Sta te  and Local Roles 
C r i t e r i a  f o r  r o l e  and program review. Because the  l e g i s l a t i v e  
and budgeting imp1 i c a t i o n s  of t he  "New I-ederal ism" proposals are n o t  
y e t  known, and because o f  t h e  changing nature  o f  federa l  
appropr ia t ions  f o r  t h e  n ine  b lock grants, - t h e  committee d i d  n o t  
develop a composite recommendation on how these funding changes should 
be handled. For s i m i l a r  reasons i t  d i d  n o t  be1 i eve  i t  had enough 
in fo rma t ion  t o  begin t o  r e d e f i n e  o r  c l a r i f y  f u t u r e  r o l e s  o f  the  s t a t e  
and i t s  l o c a l  governments. The committee i s  o f  t he  opin ion,  however, 
t h a t  such a rev iew should occur and i t  should begin du r ing  the  1983 
1 eg i  s l a t i v e  session. The comni t t e e  recommends t h a t  each standing 
committee should be d i r e c t e d  t o  c l o s e l y  examine the  r e l e v a n t  b lock  
grants  and the  s p e c i f i c  ca tego r i ca l  programs. For such a review, t h e  
committee suggests the  f o l l o w i n g  two se ts  o f  c r i t e r i a  t h a t  might  be 
followed. The c r i t e r i a  a re  designed t o  answer two basic  questions: 1) 
should a program be continued, modif ied, o r  ended; and 2) what 
governmental 1 eve1 should be responsi b l e  f o r  a program's 
admin is t ra t ion ,  funding, o r  both? 
Program Value C r i t e r i a  
1)  What i s  t h e  program's purpose? 
2) To whom i s  t h e  program impor tan t  -- the  s t a t e  as a whole, t o  
l o c a l  governments, t o  t he  pub1 i c  at - large,  o r  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  
i n t e r e s t  group. 
3) How important  i s  the  program? 
A) Does i t  reso lve  an ac tua l  , immediate need o r  problem (an 
emergency), a long-term need, o r  a perceived need o r  problem? 
B) I s  i t  a " l uxu ry "?  
C) What a l t e r n a t i v e s  e x i s t ?  
D) What would happen i f  the  program were t o  be terminated? 
E) What would happen t o  low o r  moderate income households i f  t h e  
programs were o r  were n o t  funded? 
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4) 	 What i s  the cost  o f  the program? 
A) I s  i t  (and w i l l  i t  continue t o  be) f u l l y  f ede ra l l y  funded? 
B) Are s ta te  o r  loca l  do1 l a r s  necessary f o r  i t s  cont inuat ion? 
C) Does i t  a f f e c t  the s ta te ' s  and/or a loca l  government's budget 
and p r i o r i t i e s  i n  a pos i t i ve  o r  negative manner? 

D) Can i t  be e f f e c t i v e l y  operated on less money? 

C r i t e r i a  f o r  Placement o f  a Program 
1) 	 What i s  the program's purpose? 
A) 	 Does i t  meet a statewide need, a purely loca l  need, needs o f  
a p a r t i c u l a r  group of people, o r  a combination o f  the above? 
B) 	 Does i t  add to, st imulate, o r  r e s t r i c t  government capab i l i t y  
t o  provide services, funct ions or f a c i l i t i e s ?  
C) 	 Does i t  subs t i tu te  f o r  other functions o r  expenditures? 
2)  	 How much au tho r i t y  does the program provide? 
A) 	 Are enabl ing s ta tu tes both a t  the s ta te  and loca l  leve l  
adequate? 
B) 	 Does the program usurp o r  enhance s ta te  o r  loca l  laws o r  
t r a d i t i o n a l  ro les?  
C) 	 How much au tho r i t y  does the administering e n t i t y  have (o r  
should have) t o  accept o r  r e j e c t  the program? 
D) 	 I f  the program i s  l o c a l l y  administered or  funded, what e f f e c t  
does it have on loca l  p r i o r i t i e s  and needs -- how w i l l  i t  
e f f e c t  t r a d i t i o n a l  l oca l  functions such as pol ice, f i r e  and 
san i ta t ion  services? 
E) 	 I s  the program one which the s ta te  should preempt? 
3) 	 I f the s ta te  assumes the f u l l  f i nanc ia l  burden, what funding 
sources are t o  be used? What i s  t o  be done w i  t h  re1 ieved 1 ocal 
government revenues? 
4) 	 I f  the program i s  t o  be loca l  l y  administered ( e i t h e r  so le ly  o r  on 
a shared basis) how i s  the respons ib i l i t y  t o  be placed there in  --
as a d i r e c t  mandate, as a permissive function, o r  subject t o  
ce r t a i n  condi t ions (e.g., a minimum loca l  f i nanc ia l  e f f o r t ) ?  
Reevaluating ex i s t i ng  roles. Perhaps a key f a c t  t h a t  should be 
kept i n  mind as one considers what leve l  o f  government should be made 
responsib le f o r  admin is ter ing  a program i s  t h a t  1 ocal governments a re  
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s  of t h e  s t a t e  ( a l b e i t  count ies more so than 
municipal i t i e s )  . Perhaps "New Federal ism" focuses on the  issue o f  t he  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  l o c a l i t i e s  t o  the  s t a t e  and each other. 
A t  the committee's f i r s t  meeting M a r t i n  E. Flahive, p o l i c y  
ana lys t  f o r  t he  City and County o f  Denver, suggested t h a t  the General 
Assembly r e - t h i n k  i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  broad terms. He said: 
For example, you need t o  consider the  ex ten t  t o  which 
a City ( o r  a county) serves as an i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y  o f  t he  
State -- and t o  what e x t e n t  a l o c a l i t y  i s  o r  should be 
s o l e l y  accountable t o  i t s  own c i t i zens .  Confusion about 
t h i s  dual r o l e  has, i n  my view, been the  cause o f  much 
tens ion i n  t h e  past. Now i s  the  t ime t o  d imin ish  t h a t  
tension, and b u i l d  a new cooperat ive arrangement. 
Taking t h i s  a step fu r the r ,  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  w i t h  the  
assistance of the  p a r t i e s  named above, should then 
systematical l y  reeval  uate each state-supported o r  
state-mandated serv ice  t o  ascer ta in  which 1 eve1 o f  
government i s  best  s u i t e d  t o  take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a g iven 
service. This determinat ion should not be based e x c l u s i v e l y  
on what each l e v e l  o f  government has done i n  the  past, 
wishes t o  do, o r  can a f fo rd .  It should be based, i n  the  
f i r s t  instance, upon t r a d i t i o n a l  no t ions  o f  accountabi l  ity, 
equi ty ,  and t h e  l i k e .  When t h a t  ph i losoph ica l  stage i s  
completed, t h e  i n q u i r y  should be expanded t o  inc lude o ther  
fac tors ,  and obstacles, i n  t h e  r e a l 1  ignment o f  services, 
inc lud ing,  b u t  n o t  l i m i t e d  to:  
-- past performance o f  var ious governments, 
-- a v a i l  a b i l  ity o f  s u f f i c i e n t  and appropr ia te  revenues, 
-- the s ta tus  o f  enabl ing l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
-- intergovernmental obstacles t o  serv ice  del  i very ,  and 
-- s ta te-o f - the-ar t  and techn ica l  capacity.  
S ta te  Mandates on Local Governments 
I n  the course of i t s  study, t he  committee again discussed s t a t e  
mandated l o c a l  programs. The c m i  t t e e  a l so  reviewed the 1982 Sta te  
Aud i to r ' s  specia l - r e p o r t  on Sta te  D i s t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Local En t i t i es .  
Th is  r e p o r t  l i s t s  a number of s t a t e  (and federal )  programs which are  
funded by the  s t a t e  but  l a c k  s t a t u t o r y  author i ty .  
1979 F i  ndinqs on Sta te-Mandated Programs. The 1979 i n te r im  
Committee on Local Government recommended t o  the General Assembly a 
number o f  i n t e r im  b i l l  s designed t o  minimize the e f f e c t  o f  Ctate 
mandates. (A summary of these b l l l s  i s  attached as Appendlx D). 
Because these b i l l s  were, f o r  the most part ,  omitted from the 
governor's 1980 " c a l l "  they were not  acted upon by the General 
Assembly. The committee recommends tha t  the General Assembly consider 
the s ta te  mandate question during the 1983 session. 
Other Issues Reviewed But Not Acted Upon 
1982 Audi tor 's  Report. The above-ci ted 1982 aud i to r ' s  repor t  
1 i s t ed  the fo l lowing non-s ta tu to r i l y  authorized programs: 
Medical ly Indigent reimbursement i n  the Department of 
Social Services -- $12,967,000 expended f n 1980181. 
(Note: This program transferred t o  CU Health Sciences 
Center i n  1982 due t o  t h e i r  s ta tu to ry  au tho r i t y  t o  
provide medical ly  indigent services .) 
Contracts f o r  cu l t u ra l  services i n  the Department o f  
Local Af fa i rs -- $1,981,000 expended i n  1980181. 
Juveni le Diversion program i n  the Department o f  
I n s t i t u t i o n s  -- $1,834,000 expended i n  1980181. 
Aid t o  1 ocal , non-governmental e n t i  t i e s  i n  the Of f i ce  
o f  Health Care i n  the Department o f  Health -- $520,000 
expended i n  1980181. 
Engineering Pre-Design Grants i n  the Department o f  
Local A f fa i r s  -- $100,000 expended i n  1980181. 
Emergency Water and Sewer Grants i n  the Department of 
Local A f f a i r s  -- $270,000 expended i n  1980181. 
County Equal i z a t i o n  L ibrary  D i s t r i  but ions i n  the 
Department of Education -- $112,000 expended i n  
1980181. 
Special Olympics i n  the Department o f  I n s t i t u t i o n s  --
$50,000 expended in 1980181. 
Region X I  Contingency Fund i n  the Department of 
Education -- $28,000 expended i n  1980181. 
The do1 l a r  f i gu res  are the amounts ac tua l l y  d is t r ibuted,  
not  the appropr iat ion amounts. 
The above l i s t  inc ludes on ly  those programs t h a t  d i s t r i b u t e  
money t o  l o c a l  e n t i t i e s ;  however, there may be other programs i n  
the  Long B i l l  which a1 so have no separate au tho r i z ing  
l e g i s l a t i o n .  2J/ 
Other s t a t e  programs i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the  r e p o r t  inc lude:  
A) Colorado Comnission on the Ar ts  and Humanities outreach 
serv ices -- $433,000 expended i n  1980-81. 
B) Empl o p e n  t and t r a i n i n g  contractual  services -- cont rac ts  
w i t h  l o c a l  organizat ions f o r  WIN and CETA employment programs -- s t a t e  
match on WIN program. 
Also i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the  r e p o r t  a re  several f e d e r a l l y  funded 
programs f o r  which there  i s  no s t a t u t o r y  author izat ion.  The several 
programs l i s t e d  below were selected f o r  d iscussion based on one o f  two 
c r i t e r i a :  1) program funds were I d e n t i f i e d  i n  the repor t  as having 
been appropriated by the  General Assembly, desp i te  the lack  o f  
s t a t u t o r y  author iza t ion ;  o r  2) t he  program appears t o  be one f o r  
which the s t a t e  w i l l  assume respons ib i l  i t y  as p a r t  o f  a b lock grant  o r  
the  proposed "turnback" of programs i n  the  New Federalism i n i t i a t i v e .  
The f e d e r a l l y  funded programs are: 
a) Supplemental food programs f o r  spec i f i ed  t a r g e t  populations, 
administered by Family Heal th Services i n  the  Department o f  Health. 
For f i s c a l  year 1980-81, $1.4 m i l l  i on  were appropriated by the General 
Assembly, though the  program i s  unauthorized. 
b)  Small urban and r u r a l  t r a n s i t  programs f o r  promoting pub l i c  
t ranspor ta t i on  serv ices i n  nonurbanized areas are administered by the 
D iv i s ion  o f  Transportat ion Planning i n  the  Department of Highways. 
Program funds are  no t  appropr iated by the General Assembly, bu t  i t  i s  
possib le t h a t  these are  funct ions  included i n  the  "turn-back". 
c )  The funct ions  o f  the D i v i s i o n  o f  Highway Safety and the 
D iv i s ion  o f  Highways (urban systems), though n o t  i d e n t i f i e d  as being 
funded through the  appropr ia t ions  process, are c u r r e n t l y  included i n  
the  "turn-back" proposal. 
d) Community mental heal t h  funct ions  are shown as having no 
l e g i s l a t i v e  author iza t ion ;  1980-81 gener,a1 fund appropr iat ions o f  
$247,000. 
e)  Employment and t r a i n i n g  programs (WIN and CETA) i n  the  
Department of Labor and Employment l a c k  l e g  i s l a t i v e  author izat ion,  and 
a re  proposed f o r  "turn-back" t o  the  state. 
20/ Colorado O f f i c e  o f  the  State Auditor. S ta te  D i s t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
Local En t i t i es .  Special Report, January, 1'982; p. 18. 
Commission on State and Local Government Finance. Attached 
hereto (as Appendlx E) are the recomnendations o f  the Colorado 
om mission on s t a t e  and Local Government Finance, August, 1982. I n  
b r i e f ,  the Commission recomnended that :  the s ta te  assume a l l  
admin is t ra t ive  and f inanc ia l  responsi b i l  ty  f o r  mandated pub1 i c  
assistance programs; t ha t  s ta tu to ry  author izat ion be provided t o  
f i n a n c i a l l y  ass i s t  l oca l  governments i n  meeting clean water standards; 
t ha t  the s ta te  continue t o  review the loca l  cour t  f inancing problem i n  
the context o f  l oca l  cap1 t a l  investments and review the issue o f  s ta te  
standards and 1 ocal and s ta te  responsi b i l  it i e s  f o r  j a  ils. 
-- - ---- 
BILL 1 
A BILL FOR AN ACT 
CONCERNING ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF THE OLD AGE PENSION FUND. 
B i l l  Summary 
(Note: -T h i s  summary app l i es  t o  t h i s  b i l l  in t roduced--- as 
and does n o t  necessa r i l y  r e f l e c t  any amendments wmch - may ---- be 
subsequently adopted. ) 
Provides f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  moneys from t h e  o l d  age 
pension fund  t o  pay county cos ts  o f  admin i s te r i ng  t h e  fund. 
Be i t  enacted & t h e  General Assembly o f  t h e  Sta te  o f  Colorado: 
SECTION 1. 26-1-122 (4), Colorado Revised S ta tu tes  1973, 
1982 Rep1 . Vol ., i s  amended BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW PARAGRAPH 
t o  read: 
26-1-122. County app rop r ia t i ons  and expendi tures -
advancements - procedures. (4) (i)The s t a t e  department 
s h a l l  determine monthly t h e  c o s t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f o r  each 
county o f  pension payments under t h e  o l d  age pension fund 
pursuant  t o  work load standards developed by t h e  s t a t e  
department. A f t e r  such determinat ion ,  t h e  s t a t e  department 
s h a l l  c e r t i f y  by voucher t o  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  t h e  amounts t o  be 
p a i d  t o  each county. The amounts so c e r t i f i e d  s h a l l  be p a i d  
from the  o l d  age pension .fund i n  the  s t a t e  t reasury  and s h a l l  
be c r e d i t e d  by t h e  county t r e a s u r e r  t o  the  county soc ia l  
serv ices fund. 
SECTION 2. 26-2-115, Colorado Revised Sta tu tes  1973, 
1982 Repl. Vol. ,  i s  amended t o  read: 
26-2-115. S ta te  o l d  age pension fund - p r i o r i t y .  A l l  
moneys deposi ted i n  the  s t a t e  o l d  age pension fund s h a l l  be 
f i r s t  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  payment o f  bas ic  minimum awards t o  
q u a l i f i e d  o l d  age pension r e c i p i e n t s  AND PAYMENTS FOR COSTS OF 
ADMINISTRATION, and no p a r t  o f  sa id  fund s h a l l  be t r a n s f e r r e d  
t o  any o the r  fund u n t i l  such bas ic  minimum awards AND PAYMENTS 
s h a l l  have been paid.  
SECTION 3. 26-2-116, Colorado Revised Sta tu tes  1973, 
1982 Repl . Vol . , i s  amended t o  read: 
26-2-116. Old  age pension s t a b i l i z a t i o n  fund. Any 
moneys remaining i n  t h e  * o l d  age pension fund a f t e r  f u l l  
payment o f  bas ic  minimum awards t o  qua1 i f i e d  o l d  age pension 
r e c i p i e n t s  AND AFTER PAYMENTS FOR COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION 
s h a l l  be t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  a fund t o  be - known as t h e  o l d  age 
pension s t a b i l i z a t i o n  fund, which fund s h a l l  be maintained a t  
t h e  amount o f  f i v e  m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  and res to red  t o  t h a t  amount 
a f t e r  any disbursements therefrom. The s t a t e  board s h a l l  use 
the  moneys i n  such fund on ly  t o  s t a b i l i z e  payments o f  o l d  age 
pension bas ic  minimum awards. 
SECTION 4. 26-2-117, Colorado Revised Sta tu tes  1973, 
1982 Rep1 . Vol . , i s  amended t o  read: 
26-2-117. Old age pension h e a l t h  and medical care fund. 
Any moneys remaining i n  the  s t a t e  o l d  age pension fund a f t e r  
f u l l  payment o f  bas ic  minimum awards t o  qual i f i e d  o l d  age 
pension r e c i p i e n t s ,  AFTER PAYMENTS FOR COSTS OF 
ADMINISTRATION, and a f t e r  es tab l  ishment and maintenance o f  the  
o l d  age pension s t a b i l i z a t i o n  fund i n  the  amount o f  f i v e  
I 
m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  s h a l l  be t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  a fund t o  be known as 
the  o l d  age pension h e a l t h  and medical care fund, which i s  
hereby created. The s t a t e  department s h a l l  es tab l  i s h  and 
promulgate r u l e s  and regu la t ions  f o r  admin is t ra t i on  o f  a 
program t o  p rov ide  hea l th  and medical care t o  persons who 
qual i f y  t o  rece ive  o l d  age pensions and who are  no t  p a t i e n t s  
i n  an i n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  tubercu los i s  o r  mental diseases. The 
costs  o f  such program, n o t  t o  exceed t e n  m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  i n  
any f i s c a l  year, s h a l l  be defrayed rom such h e a l t h  and 
medical care fund, b u t  a l l  moneys ava i lab le ,  accrued o r  
accruing, received o r  rece ivab le ,  i n  sa d hea l th  and medical ' . 
care  fund i n  excess o f  ten  m i l l i o n  do1 a rs  i n  any f i s c a l  year 
s h a l l  be t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  general fund o f  t h e  s t a t e  t o  be 
used pursuant t o  law. 
SECTION 5. E f f e c t i v e  date - a p p l i c a b i l i t y .  This a c t  
s h a l l  t ake  e f f e c t ' J u l y  1, 1983, and s h a l l  apply t o  months 
commencing on o r  a f t e r  sa id  date. 
SECTION 6. Safe ty  'clause. The general assembly hereby 
f i n d s ,  determines, and declares t h a t  t h i s  a c t  i s  necessary 
B i l l  1 
for  the immediate preservat idn o f  the publ ic  peace, health,  
and safety.  
- - -  - - 
-- - ---- 
BILL 2 
A BILL FOR AN ACT 
CONCERNING THE APPROPRIATION POWER. 
B i l l  Summary 
(Note: This summar a l i e s  t o  t h i s  b i l l  as introduced 
and does n o ~ c d y * t - ~ a m e n d m e n t ~ w h i  ch be 
subsequently adopted. ) 
Provides f o r  l e g i s l a t i v e  appropr ia t ion o f  a1 1 federal  
funds except h igher education research grants, highway funds, 
and categor ica l  program grants. Requires executive agencies 
t o  submit b lock grant  appl i ca t i ons  , federal  fund a1 locat ions,  
and changes i n  programs and funding leve ls  t o  an i n t e r i m  
financi a1 overview committee. Creates such committee. 
Provides f o r  the  committee t o  review block grant  appl icat ions 
and approve federal  fund a l loca t ions  and funding changes 
dur ing  the  in ter im.  Requires the  committee t o  repor t  t o  the 
general assembly. Provides f o r  the repeal o f  the  s ta tu te  
c rea t i ng  t h i  s committee. 
Be i t enacted by the  General Assembly o f  the  State o f  Colorado: 
.SECTION 1. A r t i c l e  3 o f  t i t l e  2, Colorado Revised 
Statutes 1973, 1980 Rep1 . Vol . , as amended, is amended BY THE 
ADDITION OF A NEW PART t o  read: 
PART 12 
INTERIM FINANCIAL OVERVIEW COMMITTEE 
2-3-1201. Legis la t ive.  declarat ion.  The general assembly 
hereby f inds , determines , and declares: That the  
appropr ia t ion o f  moneys i s  a l e g i s l a t i v e  duty and funct ion;  
t h a t  b lock grant  l e g i s l a t i o n  delegates broad d i sc re t i on  t o  the 
s t a t e  i n  the a l l o c a t i o n  o f  moneys f o r  state-operated programs 
which should be exercised by the  general assembly through the 
appropr ia t ions process and other  lawfu l  means; and t h a t  
f a i l u r e  t o  provide d i r e c t i o n  i n  the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  moneys t o  
< 
t he  execut ive branch dur ing the  1 eg i  s l  a t i v e  i n t e r i m  would 
weaken the p r i n c i p l e  of the  separation o f  powers o f  
government. The general assembly f u r t h e r  declares t h a t  the 
c rea t i on  o f  an i n t e r i m  f i n a n c i a l  overview committee i s  the 
best  ava i lab le  means o f  i nsu r i ng  t h a t  the  general assembly 
e f f e c t i v e l y  exercises i t s  l e g i s l a t i v e  responsibi  1 i t i e s .  
2-3-1202. Legi s1 a t i  ve appropr ia t ion o f  federa l  moneys. 
(1) Except as provided i n  subsection (2) o f  t h i s  sect ion,  no 
moneys i n  t he  s t a t e  t reasury  received from any agency o f  the 
federa l  government, i nc l ud ing  b lock  grant  fund moneys provided 
pursuant t o  the federa l  "Omnibus Budget Reconc i l i a t ion  Act o f  . 
01981'' 	 and o ther  b lock grants provided pursuant t o  federa l  law, 
s h a l l  be expended f o r  any purpose unless such moneys are 
appropr iated by the general assembly. 
(2) The f o l l ow ing  federa l  moneys sha l l  no t  be 
appropriated: 
(a) Moneys received from the federa l  government by the 
s t a t e  f o r  t he  const ruct ion,  improvement, o r  maintenance o f  
s t a t e  highways ; 
(b) Moneys received from the  federa l  government by the 
s t a t e  as grants  f o r  research a t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  higher 
educat i  on; 
(c) Categor ical  g ran t  moneys received from the  federal  
government by the  s t a te  f o r  s p e c i f i c ,  narrowly def ined 
a c t i v i t i e s  sub jec t  t o  s t r i c t  federa l  gu ide l ines.  
2-3-1203. I n t e r i m  f i n a n c i a l  overview commi t t e e  -
I 
created. There i s  hereby created i n  t he  l e g i s l a t i v e  
department t he  i n t e r i m  f i n a n c i a l  overview committee, r e f e r red  
t o  i n  t h i  s  p a r t  12 as t he  "committee". The committee sha l l  
cons is t  o f  
(2) The general assembly may prov ide by r u l e  f o r  the  
appointment o f  members t o  t he  committee. 
(3) The commi t t e e  may meet as o f t e n  as necessary, b u t  i t 
s h a l l  meet n o t  l ess  than once a month dur ing the  l e g i s l a t i v e  
in te r im.  
2-3-1204. Executive agency n o t i f i c a t i o n .  Executive 
agencies s h a l l  submit t o  the  committee proposed app l ica t ions . 
f o r  b l ock  g ran t  funds, proposed a l l oca t i ons  o f  federa l  funds 
between s t a t e  government uses and l o c a l  government uses, and 
proposed changes in programs and program funding 1 evel s 
necessi tated by changes i n  federa l  law o r  regu la t ions  o r  
funding 1 evel  s. 
2-3-1205. Powers and du t i es  o f  the  committee. (1) The 
committee s h a l l  be empowered to: 
(a) Review appl icat i 'ons f o r  b lock  g ran t  funds by 
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executive agencies during the legislative interim before 
submission to  the federal government; 
(b) Approve any executive agency allocation of federal 
funds between s ta te  government uses and local government uses 
during the legislative interim; 
(c) Approve changes in program funding levels 
necessitated by changes in federal law or regulations or 
funding levels during the legislative interim subject to 
limits imposed by the general assembly in the general 
appropriation bi 11 ; 
(d) Advise executive agencies seeking to make program 
pol icy adjustments necessitated by changes in federal law or 
regulations or funding levels during the legislative interim; 
(e) Report to  the general assembly annually in January 
d 
on actions taken by the committee during the previous 
legislative interim. 
2-3-1206. Standards for and 1 imi t s  upon committee 
action, (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of th i s  part . 
12, the committee shall not act  contrary to an expressed 
legislative policy, nor shall i t  approve or undertake any 
action during the legislative interim which was rejected a t  
the immediately preceding session of the general assembly. 
(2) The committee shall not approve or undertake any 
changes i n program f undi ng 1eve1s duri ng the 1 egi s l  ative 
interim unless fai lure t o  ac t  would result in the loss of 
moneys by the s ta te  or hardshlp t o  the Intended beneflciarles 
'. 
-42-
o f  such programs. 
(3) Act ion by t h e  committee sha l l  on ly  be e f f e c t i v e  
u n t i l  t he  end o f  the f i s c a l  year i n  which such ac t i on  i s  taken 
o r  u n t i l  t he  general assembly acts  i n  a cont rary  manner, 
whichever occurs f i r s t .  
2-3-1207. Repeal. This , p a r t  12 i s  repealed, e f f e c t i v e  
December 31, 1984. 
SECTION 2. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby 
f inds ,  determines, and declares t h a t  t h i s  ac t  i s  necessary 
f o r  t he  immediate preservat ion o f  t he  p u b l i c  peace, health, 
and safety.  
B i l l  2 
A P P E N D I X  A 
CATEGORICAL GRANT PROGRAMS CONSOLIDATED INTO 

BLOCK GRANTS BY OMNIBUS RECONCILIAT1ON ACT OF 1981 

I. Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health (10 categorical 
Bl ock Grant programs) 
Drug Abuse Communlty Qrv ice  Pro rams 





Drug Abuse Demonstration Programs 

A1 cohol Formul a Grants 

Drug Abuse Preventlon/Fomula Grants 

Drug Abuse Prevent1 on Programs 

Special A1 cohol ism Projects t o  Imple-

ment the Uniform Act 

C m u n l t y  Mental Health Centers --

Comprehensive Services Su p o r t  

A1 coho1 Demonstratlon/Eva !uat lon 

Alcohol Abuse Prevention Dmonstra-

t lon/Eval uat lon 

11. 	 Maternal and Chl ld  Health Block Grant (9  categor lcal  
programs) 
Crippled Chl l  drens Servlces 
Maternal and Chl ld  Health Research 
Maternal and Chl l  d Heal t h  Servlces 
Maternal and Chl ld  Health Traln lng 
Ch 11 dhood Lead Based Pal n t  Poi son1 ng 
Prevent 1 on 
Sudden I n fan t  Death Syndrome Informs- 
tion and Counsel ing 
Comprehenslve Hmophll  l a  Diagnostic 
and Treatment Centers 
Genetic Disease Testlng and Counsel-
Ing  Servlces 
Ado1 escent Pregnancy Preventl on Ser-
vices 
111. 	 Primary Care Block Grant (2 categorl  cal  
programs) 
1. Comnunl t y  Heal t h  Centers 
2. Hospital A f f i l i a t e d  Care Centers 
I V ,  	 Preventive Heal t h  and Heal t h  Servl ces ( 1  ex i s t i ng  block 
Bl ock Grants grant  and 6 cate-
Includes ex i s t i ng  block grant -- Health gor i  cal programs) 
Incent ive Grants f o r  Comprehensive Pub1 l c  
Heal t h  Services -- plus the fo l low ing  
categor ical  s: 
1. 	 Urban Rat Control 
2. 	 Emergency Medical Services 
3. 	 Hypertension Program 
4. 	 Home Health Services and Train ing 
5. 	 Preventive Health Service --
Fluor idat ion Grants 
6. 	 Grants f o r  Health Education/Risk 
Reduction 
V. 	 El ementary and Secondary Educati on Block 
Grant 
C i v i l  Rights Technical Assistance and 
Training 
Teacher Centers 
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Education Pro- 
gram 
Fol 1 ow Through 
S t reng theni  ng State Educational 
Agency Management 
Teacher Corps -- Operations and 
Train ing 
Emergency School Aid Act -- Basic 
Grants t o  Local Education Agencies 
Emergency School Aid Act -- Grants t o  
Non-Prof it Organi zat ions 
Emergency School Aid Act - Educa-
t i ona l  TV and Radio 
Educational Tel ev i  s ion and Radl o Pro- 
grammi ng 
Use o f  Technology i n  Basic S k i l l s  --
Ins t ruc t ion  
Ethnic Heritage Studies Program 
National D i f fus ion  Program 
Career Education 
Education f o r  the Use o f  the Metr ic  
System o f  Measurement 
Education f o r  G i f ted  and Talented 
Children and Youth (State Adminis- 
tered and D ls c r e t i  onary Programs) 
Community Education 
Consumers' Education 
Elementary and Secondary School Edu-
cat ion i n  the Ar ts  
Ins t ruc t iona l  Material and School 
L ibrary  Resources 
Improvement i n  Local Educational 
Pract ice 
In ternat iona l  Understand1 ng Program 





School s , Unlvers l  ty/Buslness Coopera- 
t l ~ nand Neutral  S l t e  Plannlng 
Career Educatl on Sta te  A1 1 otment Pro- 
gram 
Baslc S k l l l  s Improvement 
Emergency School Aid Act -- Pl  annl ng 
Grants 
Emergency School Ald Act --
Pre-Implementatlon Asslstance Grants 
Emergency School Ald Act --
Out-of-Cycl e Grants 
Emergency School Ald Act  -- Speclal
D l sc re t l ona ry  Ass1 stance Grants 
Emergency School Ald Act -- Sta te  
Agency Grants 
Emergency School Ald Act -- Grants 
f o r  t he  Ar ts  
B l m e d l c a l  Sciences f o r  Tal ented Dls- 
advantaged Secondary Students 
Pre-Col 1 ege Teacher Devel opment I n  
Science Programs 
Secretary 's  D l sc re t i ona ry  Program 
Law-Re1 a ted Educatl on 
C i t i e s  i n  Schools 
PUSH f o r  Excel 1 e w e  
V I .  	 S ta te  Community Development Bl ock Grant 

(small c i t i e s  and r u r a l  areas) 

1. 	 Comnunlty Developrlent Block Grants --
Small C i  t l e s  
(Note: Budget Reconcll i a t l o n  Act  
a l so  fo lded I n  t h e  f o l l o y l n g  
~ a t e g o r l c a l s  t o  the  e x l s t l n  Comu-
n i t y  Development Block Grant 3 
-- Comprehenslve Plannlng Asslstance -- Secretary's D lscre t lonary  Fund/ 
T e r r l t o r l e s  Pro ram B-- Nelghborhood Se f-Help Development 
V I I .  Soclal  Servlces Block Grant 
Includes e x l s t l n g  b lock  g ran t  (Soclal  
Servlces f o r  Low Income and Pub1 l c  Assls- 
tance Reclp lents)  p lus  t h e  f o l l  owlng ca t -  
egor ica l  : 
1. 	 Social Servlces T ra ln lng  Grants --
(expanded an 
e x l s t l g g  d iscre-
t l o n a r y  grant )  
(1 e x l s t l n g  b lock  
grant  and 1 cate-
gor lc41 program) 
TI t l e  XX 
V III. Comunl t y  Servl ces Bl oc k Grant 	 (7 categor lcal  
programs) 
Comnunlty Action 
ComnunIt y  Food and Nu trltIon 
Older Persons Opportunlt les and Ser-
vices 
Comnunl t y  Economl c Development 
State Economl c Opportunlty Off lces 
Nat l  onal Youth Sports Program 
Houslng and Comnunlty Development 
(Rural Housl ng) 
I X .  	 Low Income Home Energy Assl stance Block (1 categorlcal 
Grant program) 
Low Income Energy Assl stance Program 
Sources : Advisory Comnlssion on Intergovernmental Re1 at lons, Febru-
ary, 1982; based on data provided I n  a memorandum from U.S. 




DESCRIPTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL STATE LEGISLATIVE MECHANISMS 

TO CONTROL FEDERAL FUNDS 

Alabama: A major part of the annual Alabama state budget is earmarked. 

fund appropriations are open-ended, with 1 ittle or no detail provided 
in the budget bill. During its 1981 session, the Alabama legislature passed 
two joint resolutions that dealt with block grants. SJR 19 created an interim 
legislative committee to study federal block grants and SJR 215 expanded the 
scope of one of the legislature's select joint committees, "to investigate and 
report on the impending impact of federal block grants to operate state health 
and welfare programs. " 
Alaska: The Alaska legislature maintains a high degree of control over 

funds through a strong session budget process and a strong legislative 

advisory role during the interim. Under this process, the governor must 

respond in writing to the Legislative Budget Committee if he authorizes 

federal fund expenditures over their objection. This process was developed 

after the defeat of a constitutional amendment allowing the legislature to 

delegate its appropriations authority to a committee. 

Arizona: Based in part on a 1974 case, Navajo Tribe v. Arizona Department of 

Adminitration (528 P2d 623), the Arizona legislature cannot appropriate 

federal funds. In 1979, the legislature passed a bill requiring legislative 

grant application review, which was vetoed by the governor. 

- Arkansas: The Arkansas legislature exerts fairly high appropriation control 
-, -era1 funds during their biennial session, appropriating most funds in 

specific sum to programs or agencies. The governor accepts and authorizes 

federal fund expenditures during the interim with the advice of the 

Leg is1 at ive Counci 1. The Off ice of Budget forwards agency requests for 

additional federal funds to the Legislative Council, which must comment on 

such requests before funds can be extended. The full legislature must ratify 

the governor's decisions during the next session, or the state no longer 

participates in the program. 

California: In 1978, the legislature passed a bill creating a federal trust 

fund and accounting procedure which required appropriation of federal funds 

and improved system for accounting and tracking federal funds. By F Y  1983-84, 

the California legislature will be able to appropriate federal funds 

comprehensively. During 1981, legislation was passed in California which 

established a joint legislative-executive advisory committee for the 





Colorado: Prior to 1982, the Colorado legislature exercised little oversight 

-era1 funds, except to tightly control any required state match. In 

1982, however, the legislature decided to appropriate the block grants in its 

major budget bill. The Governor subsequently vetoed the language in the bill 

which appropriated the blocks, claiming that a 1972 Colorado Supreme Court 
case, Mac Manus V. Love, 179, Colo. 218, denied the legislature the authority 
to appropriate federal funds. The legislature is now suing the Governor over 
his veto because they do not believe that the 1972 case applies to block grant 
funds. The legislature ' is not involved in federal grant application review. 
Connecticut: In 1979, the legislature enacted legislation creating an 

advisory role for itself in the grant application and award notification 

processes, and establishing legislative receipt of federal funds information 

through the federal A-95 and TC-1082 information systems. To assure its 

involvement in the allocation of block grant funds, Connecticut passed PA 

81-449 in 1981, which stated that during FY '81-82: 









o 	 Any modification of funding for programs necessitated by reduction in 

federal funds can occur only if there is legislation that allows this 

Delaware: The Delaware legislature participates in the state A-95 

-house activities. Two legislators plus the legislative 

a1 serve on the clearinghouse, which maintains year-round 

oversight of applications submitted by state and local governments for federal 





Florida: The Florida legislature maintains a high degree of appropriation 

over federal funds, appropriating specific sums at the subprogram 

level and using a statewide accounting system to track and systematize federal 

funds information. Interim control is informal and advisory; the Cabinet, 

which has the format control, consults with legislative appropriations 

committees prior to approving federal funds. During 1981, the Florida 

legislature formed a Select Committee on Federal Budget Cutbacks and developed 

a general policy statement and detailed guidelines which were used by the 

Senate Appropriations Comnittee in writing the 1982 Senate Appropriations Bi 11. 

Georgia: The Georgia legislature exerts control over federal funds through a 

specific appropriation of all federal funds to the subprogram level, and 

through an advisory role in both the executive branch's interim handling of 

unanticipated federal receipts and the federal grant application process. 

Hawaii: The executive branch, through the governor and department heads has 
-primary responsibility for federal funds oversight. During its 1982 session, 





Idaho: The Idaho leg is1 ature appropriates nearly a1 1 federal funds 

hcognizable" or known at the time of the annual legislative budget process. 

However, the legislature does not maintain control over federal funds during 





increased control, including grant application review and review of new 

federal projects by a legislative advisory committee. 

Illinois: Illinois legislative efforts to control federal funds have focused 

o n d e v e l o p m e n t  of a comprehensive federal fund information and tracking 

system, based in large part upon agency surveys conducted by the Illinois 

Commission on Intergovernmental Cooperation. The legislature also maintains a 

moderate degree of appropri ation control over federal funds during the 

session, appropriating these funds from trust funds to state agencies for 

certain line items. 

Indiana: The governor is statutorily empowered to accept federal funds which 

a r e t h e n  automatically appropriated according to federal law. Legislative 

oversight over these funds is exerted, in part, through the legislative 

membership on the state Budget Committee, which advises the state budget 

agency on budgetary and fiscal matters raised by the agency. 

-Iowa: The 1981 session of the Iowa legislature made major changes in the Iowa 
statutes concerning federal funds. The governor must now include a statement 
detailing how much federal funds he anticipates the state will receive during 
the next biennium and indicating how the funds will be used and the programs 
to which they will be allocated. Block grants received must be deposited in a 
special account subject to appropriation by the legislature. The grant 
application process remains one of an advisory capacity by the legislature. 
Kansas: The Kansas legislature exerts a fairly high degree of control over 

funds through the appropriations process and a strong legislative role 

in the interim appropriation of federal funds. The State Finance Council, the 

interim control 1 ing body, is composed of the governor and eight legislators. 

This counci 1 has binding authority to approve receipt and expenditure of 

unappropriated federal funds, and to increase expenditure authority on 

appropri at i ng federal funds. 

Kentucky-: The Kentucky legislature appropriates federal funds on a 1 imi ted 

basis, by "lump sum." In 1982, the legislature passed HB 648 which provides 

for binding legislative review of federal block grant applications. 

Louisiana: The Louisiana legislature has a long tradition of strong

'legislati've control of federal funds, accompl i shed by specific federal fund 

appropriations to programs or agencies, and by binding legislative interim 

authority over unanticipated federal receipts. The 24-member Legislative 

Budget Committee composed of the Senate Finance Committee and the House 

Appropriations Committee, has the authority to accept or refuse such moneis. 

The constitutionality of this committee was upheld in a 1977 Louisiana case, 

State ex rel. The Guste v. Legislative Budget Committee et a1 (347 S. 2d 

60). In its 1981 session. the Louisiana leaislature instituted a reauirement 

that federal funds received in the form of- blocks be reviewed by t'he Joint 

Legislative Committee on the Budget, where federal funds are newly 

incorporated into the state budget. The Louisiana House Appropriations 

Committee also establ ished a subcommi ttee to review block grants. 

Maine: In 1981, Maine enacted the following law: 

Any change f rom fede ra l  , c a t e g o r i c a l  g ran ts  t o  fede ra l  b lock  grants  should 
n o t  be implemented on t h e  s t a t e  l e v e l  w i thou t  recommendations from the  
committee having j u r i s d i c t i o n  over appropr ia t ions  and f i n a n c i a l  a f f a i r s  
and approval by the  l e g i s l a t i v e  branch o f  s t a t e  government. 
Mar land: By c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t he  Maryland l e g i s l a t u r e  can o n l y  reduce the-5-execu i v e  budget. W i th in  t h i s  c o n s t r a i n t ,  however, t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  does 
main ta in  a h igh  l e v e l  o f  f ede ra l  fund app rop r ia t i on  a c t i v i t y ,  making spec i f i c  
appropr ia t ions  t o  var ious  programs o r  agencies. I n  1982, a b i l l  was passed 
(H.B. 1458) which requ i res  the  execut ive  t o  c o n s u l t  w l t h  the  L e g i s l a t i v e  
P o l i c y  Committee p r i o r  t o  making any s t a t e  de terminat ion  on b lock  grants. 
Massachusetts: I n  1981, the  Massachusetts l e g i s l a t u r e  g r e a t l y  increased i t s  
overs igh t  o f  f ede ra l  funds. A l l  f e d e r a l  funds rece ived by the  s t a t e  must now 
be deposited i n  a  spec ia l  General Federal Grants Fund, sub jec t  t o  
appropr ia t ion  by the  l e g i s l a t u r e .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  must be 
n o t i f i e d  o f  a l l  f e d e r a l  g ran t  a p p l i c a t i o n s  a t  l e a s t  30 days p r i o r  t o  
submission. F i n a l l y ,  t he  l e g i s l a t i o n  s p e c i f i e s  r e p o r t s  t h a t  s t a t e  agencies 
must r e g u l a r l y  submit t o  t he  l e g i s l a t u r e  concerning federal  funds. 
Michigan: The Michigan l e g i s l a t u r e  has one o f  t he  more comprehensive c o n t r o l  
processes over f ede ra l  funds i n  t he  count ry  because i t  exe r t s  s p e c i f i c  sum 
appropr ia t ions  c o n t r o l  throughout t he  year. I n  add i t ion ,  i t  requ i res  the  
execut ive branch t o  prepare an annual r e p o r t  i t e m i z i n g  a l l  federa l  ass is tance 
t o  the  s ta te .  It a l s o  rece ives  t i m e l y  r e p o r t s  on g ran t  a p p l i c a t i o n s  and 
awards. Three b i l l s  were passed i n  Michigan du r ing  1981, dea l i ng  w i t h  
l e g i s l a t i v e  ove rs igh t  o f  b lock  grants.  SCR 355 requ i red  t h a t  a l l  s t a t e  
agencies inform the  l e g i s l a t u r e  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r ,  and t h e  r e c e i p t  of, 
federa l  b lock  grants  and d i r e c t e d  the  governor t o  s e t  f o r t h  i n  d e t a i l  i n  t h e  
budget t he  proposed expendi tures o f  f e d e r a l  b lock g r a n t  funds. Under PA 30, 
the  Department of Management and Budget must submit t o  t he  l e g i s l a t u r e  an 
annual r e p o r t  on fede ra l  assistance. And PA 18 declared t h a t ,  if 
appropr ia t ions  a re  made f rom federa l  revenues, t he  amount expended s h a l l  n o t  
exceed the  amount appropr iated i n  t h e  budget a c t  o r  t he  amount p a i d  in ,  
whichever i s  t he  lesser .  
Minnesota: L e g i s l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  over f e d e r a l  funds i s  accompl ished i n  several  -
ways i n  Minnesota. F i r s t ,  most f e d e r a l  funds are appropr iated by s ta tu te ,  
w i t h  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  e x e r t i n g  a f a i r l y  h igh  degree o f  c o n t r o l  by s p e c i f i c  sum 
approp r ia t i on  t o  program o r  agency. Second, the  l e g i s l a t u r e  can a t tach  
" r i d e r s "  t o  t he  e i g h t  omnibus a p p r o p r i a t i o n  b i l l s  t o  c o n t r o l  t he  h i r i n g  of 
personnel and t h e  commitment o f  s t a t e  funds. I n  1979, t he  l e g i s l a t u r e  passed 
a law r e q u i r i n g  l e g i s l a t i v e  rev iew o f  i n t e r i m  r e c e i p t  and expendi ture of 
federal  funds. For  new programs, personnel l e v e l  changes, and proposed 
increases i n  s t a t e  match, an agency must secure the  recomnendation of t h e  
L e g i s l a t i v e  Advisory Committee (which i s  g e n e r a l l y  fo l lowed) .  F i n a l l y ,  the  
l e g i s l a t u r e  rece ives  g ran t  application " p o l i c y  notes"  which g i v e  reasons f o r  
a p p l i c a t i o n  and prov ide  fund ing  l e v e l  in fomat ion .  During 1981, the  Minnesota 
l e g l s l a t u r e  passed a b i l l  r e q u i r i n g  one-quarter o f  FY '82 b lock  g r a n t  monies 
t o  be a l l o c a t e d  according t o  p r i o r  c a t e g o r i c a l  uses, w l t h  the  remainder t o  be 
appropr iated by the  l e g l s l a t u r e  when i t  reconvened. During the  i n t e r i m  a  f u l l  
appropr ia t ions  committee meeting was h e l d  on f e d e r a l  c u t s  and b lock  grant  
l e g i s l a t i o n .  
: The l e g  i s 1  a tu re  appropr ia tes  f e d e r a l  funds, and has an i n - s t a t e  
f o r  f e d e r a l  funds, b u t  p lays  no r o l e  i n  t he  review o f  g ran t  
appl i ca t i ons .  
Missour i :  The Missour i  l e g i s l a t u r e  exe r t s  a f a i r l y  h igh  degree of 
v a t i o n s  c o n t r o l  over federa l  funds du r ing  session, app rop r ia t i ng  
s p e c i f i c  sums t o  var ious  programs o r  agencies. I n  1978, a law was passed 
e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  " federa l  g ran t  program fund" which has al lowed b e t t e r  t ranck ing  
and c o n t r o l  over f e d e r a l  funds. Under t h i s  law, agencies are requ i red  t o  
p rov ide  a  monthly r e p o r t  on federa l  g ran t  expenditures. The l e g  i s 1  a t u r e  
exe r t s  no c o n t r o l  over these funds du r ing  t h e  i n t e r i m  due t o  a 1975 s t a t e  
Supreme Court case, Danfor th v. M e r r i l l  (530 SW2d 209). The 1981 
appropri  a t  i o n  f o r  t he  Department o f  Soc ia l  Serv ices inc luded the  f o l  lowing 
d i r e c t i v e :  ". . . Federal b lock  grants  rece ived by the  Department o f  Soc ia l  
Services s h a l l  be adminis tered under t h e  ove rs igh t  o f  a ( j o i n t  
l e g i s l  a t ive-execut  i v e )  committee." 
Montana: The b i e n n i a l  Montana l e g i s l a t i o n  c o n t r o l s  federa l  funds t o  a hi.gh 
d e g r e e i n  the  app rop r ia t i on  process through ca re fu l  s c r u t i n y  by appropr ia t ions  
comni t tees .  Appropri  a t  ions  are accompanied by d e t a i  l e d  background in fo rmat  i o n  
prov ided through a  s ta tewide budget and accounting system t h a t  t racks  a l l  
f ede ra l  income by g ran t  and inc ludes  a l l  funds coming t o  the  u n i v e r s i t i e s .  
Because o f  i t s  b i e n n i a l  session and budget, t h e  Montana l e g i s l a t u r e  has t r i e d  
t o  secure i n t e r i m  appropr ia t ions  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  a committee. Defeated i n  a 
1975 Montana supreme ' c o u r t  r u l i n g ,  Montana e x  r e 1  Judge v. L e g i s l a t i v e  Finance 
Comnittee, t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  passed a b i l l  i n  1981 r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  a spec ia l  
session tie he ld  d u r i n s  t h e  1981-83 i n t e r i m  t o  appropr ia te  federa l  funds. A 
spec ia l  session was ;ubsequently h e l d  i n  ~ovember '1981 a t  which t ime the  
l e g i s l a t u r e  appropr ia ted  b lock grants. The l e g i s l a t u r e  then recessed, bu t  d i d  
n o t  adjourn, i n  order  t o  ma in ta in  app rop r ia t i ons  c o n t r o l  over any a d d i t i o n a l  
b lock grants t h a t  might  come t o  the  s t a t e  be fore  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ' s  nex t  
r e g u l a r  session. 
Nebraska: A1 though the  l e g i s l a t u r e  exe r t s  a  1  i m i t e d  amount o f  appropr ia t ionscon over f e d e r a l  funds, maki ng open-ended appropr iat ions,  the  
l e g i s l a t u r e s ' s  Execut ive Board has an adv isory  r o l e  i n  both the  grant  
a p p l i c a t i o n  process and i n  the  i n t e r i m  r e c e i p t  and expendi ture o f  
unant ic ipa ted  f e d e r a l  rece ip t s .  I n  add i t ion ,  t h e  ' l e g i s l a t u r e  rece ives  fede ra l  
g ran t  a p p l i c a t i o n  and award informa,t ion. 
Nevada: The Nevada l e g i s l a t u r e  c o n t r o l s  t h e  f l o w  o f  f ede ra l  funds on a 
year-round basis.  During session, i t  must au tho r i ze  t h e  expendi ture o f  any 
funds and grants i n  an "author ized expendi ture act." During t h e  in te r im,  the  
I n t e r i m  Finance Committee must approve t h e  acceptance o f  g i f t s  o r  grants 
(subsequent t o  agency acceptance) ; g i f t s  o f  $10,000 o r  smal l e r ,  governmental 
grants o f  $50,000 o r  less ,  and g i f t s  o r  g ran ts  o t  t he  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Nevada 
system and t h e  Nevada i n d u s t r i a l  commission are exempt. SB 619, passed i n  
1981, requ i res  t h a t :  
Whenever f e d e r a l  fund ing  i n  t h e  form o f  a ca tego r i ca l  g ran t  o f  a 
s p e c i f i c  program adminis tered by a s t a t e  agency . . . i s  terminated 
and incorporated i n t o  a  b lock  g r a n t  . . . the  agency must o b t a i n  the  
approval of the interim Finance Committee in order to allocate the 

money received from any block grant. 

New Ham shire: The New Hampshire legilature controls federal funds through 

appropriation by subprogram for block, categorical, and 

pass-through funds. Like other part-time legislatures, New Hampshire's 

concerns have focused on ways to exert year-round control. As a result, the 

Fiscal Committee, whi le not appropriating federal funds during the interim, 

must approve a1 1 new positions. Also, a bi 1 1  was passed by the legislature in 

1981 requiring the governor to notify the presiding officers of the Senate and 

House of Representatives of any block grant awards by the federal government. 

Any allocation of these grants must be approved by the General Court. 

New Jerse : Although the New Jersey legislature exerts only a moderate amount - 7 - 3contro over federal funds in the approrpiations process, it has begun to o 

exert control over these funds through two other procedures. First, the 

legislative budget officer must review and approve the receipt and expenditure 

of non-state funds received by the executive budget office. Second, the 

Legislative Budget Office monitors agency compliance with legislative intent 

in terms of program size and total appropriations. The Joint Appropriations 

Comnittee has also established a Federal Funds Subcommittee to work with the 

Legislative Budget Office, the governor's budget office and state agencies on 

matters pertaining to federal funds and federal programs. During 1981, the 

legislature formed a Subcommittee on Federal Aid and the Joint Appropriations 

Comnittee intensified its oversight of federal funds. 

New Mexico: Although the New Mexico legislature cannot appropriate federal 
funds for constitutional institutions because of a 1974 State Supreme Court 
decision, it does play a significant advisory role over grant application 
awards, and unanticipated federal receipts through the Legis Tatfve Finance 
Committee (LFC) and its staff. The LFC receives grant applfcation information 
on request and biweekly reports from the executive branch on grant awards. An 
interim Federal Funds Reduction Study Committee was set up in 1981 by the 
legislature to monitor the federal budget process, determine state and 1 ocal 
impact, and draft legislation. 
New York: In 1981, the New York legislature passed legislation which switched 

the state from cash accounting to general ly accepted accounting principles. 

In the process, it also took on responsibility for appropriating federal 

iunds. Under the new legislation, the state comptrollers must publish 

detailed monthly reports on the sources and uses of funds, including federal 

funds. The legislature also has an advisory role in grant application reviews. 

North Carolina: In 1981, the North Carolina legislature passed a bill which 

required all federal block grant funds received by the state between August 

31, 1981 and July 1, 1983 to be received by the General Assembly. It also 

established a Joint Legislative Committee to Review Federal Block Grant 

Funds. In February 1982, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued an opinion 

which found unconstitutional the delegation of approval /disapproval authority 

over interim federal receipts to the Joint Legislative Comnittee. The 

legislature makes specific sum appropriations of federal funds. 

North Carolina: In 1981 the North Carolina legislature passed a bill which 

required all federal block grant funds 'received by the state between August 

31, 1981, and July 1, 1983, to be received by the General Assembly. It also 

establ ished a Joint Legislative Committee to Review Federal Block Grant 

Funds. In February 1982 the North Carolina Supreme Court issued an opinion 

which found unconstitutional the delegation of approval/disapproval authority 

over interim federal receipts to the Joint Legislative Committee. The 

legislature makes specific sum appropriations of federal funds. 

North Dakota: The North Dakota legislature uses the appropriations process to 

control federal funds. Most appropriations are specific sum, made at the 

agency level. During the interim, appropriations chairmen serve on a 

fi ve-member Emergency Commission, which authori zes the expend1 ture of 

unanticipated federal recelpts. 

-Ohio: The Ohio legisl ature controls federal funds through the appropriations 
process, through agency federal fund information reports to legislative budget 
staff, and through participation on the State Control 1 ing Board. This 
seven-member board, composed of si x leg1 sl ators and the state budget d irector, 
authorizes the receipt and expenditure of unappropriated federal receipts 
during the legislative interim. The legislature has also created a Joint 
Legislative Committee on Federal Funds to monitor the receipt and expenditure 
of federal funds and to review all new federal grant programs. This committee 
functions in an advisory capacity to the State Control1 ing Board and General 
Assembly in all matters related to federal grant programs. 
Oklahoma: The legislature passed a bill (SB 326) dealing with legislative

oversight of federal funds in 1981. That bill directed that claims by state 

agencies for federal funds may not be processed without written authorization 

from the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House. The bill also 

created a Joint Committee on Federal Funds with authority to 

approve/disapprove federal fund appl icat ions. ow eve;, a recently released 

advi sory opinion by the Oklahoma attorney general found this latter procedure 

to constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to a 

committee. The Ok 1 ahoma leg is 1 ature does not appropri ate federal funds. 

Oregon: The Oregon legislature exerts a high degree of year-round 

appropri ations and appl ication control over federal funds. During the 

biennial session, it appropriates specific sums to subprogram activitfes. 

During the interim, the 17-member legislative Emergency Board, which was 

established by constitutional amendment in 1963, has the statutory authority 





Penns lvania: As a full-time legislature, the Pennsylvania General Assembly 

con ro s ederal funds in its regular appropriations process through the
+
passage of a separate federal appropriation bill. This activity is based on 

an improved state budget and accounting system which is beginning to track 

federal funds going to state agencies. The Pennsylvania General Assembly's 

authority to appropriate federal funds was upheld in all appeals of Shapp v. 

-Sl oan . 
Rhode Island: The legislature does not appropriate federal funds, but its 

fiscal offices do review grant applications. The Executive Budget Agency is 

authori zed to receive and expend unanticlpated federal recelpts duri ng the 

interim. The legislature does receive federal grant application and award 

notification data upon request, to review distribution of funds. 

South Carollna: The South Carolina legislature exerts a high degree of 

control over federal funds, both through grant application approval and the 

appropri at ions process. Throughout the year, the Joint Appropriations Review 

Commi ttee has author1 ty to approve or disapprove grant applications and 

appropriations. In addition, the governor reports monthly on indirect cost 

recoveries and research grants and loans. South Carolina is also establishing 

a comprehensive federal funds tracking and budgeting system. These increased 

control mechanisms were authorized in a 1978 law requiring state legislative 

authority over "a1 1 funds .'I Recently, the executive branch chal lenged the 

constitutional i ty of the Joint Appropriations Review Committee. An opinion 

has not, as of this writing, been issued on the matter. 

South Dakota; The South Dakota legislature uses the appropriations process to 

control federal funds. During session, the legislature makes specific sum 

appropriations to various programs. During the interim, the Joint Committee 

on Appropriations has the authority to approve or deny the expenditure of 

unanticipated federal receipts upon the recommendation of the governor. In 

the past, the legislature unsuccessful ly tried to review grant appl ications, 

but the paperwork made this approach infeasible. 

Tennessee: A1 though federal funds are automatically appropriated to some 

degree, the legislature exerts control over these funds in the following 

ways: 1 )  The legislature authorizes total spending levels, based on actual 

state appropriations and estimated federal receipts. To the extent that 

federal funds are reduced, so is the state share, but total spending

authorization is not increased when federal funds increase. 2) No state 

agency can expand or adopt programs without notifying the Finance and Ways and 

Means Commi ttees and securing comment from the chairmen. A1 though their 

approval is not required by statute, in practice this approval is needed 

before the agency can spend the additional funds. 3) A 1981 law requires the 

Comnission of Finance and Administration to submit a plan for implementing 

federal block grants to the legislature. 

-Texas : The Texas 1 egis1 ature ' s 1eve 1 of appropri at ions varies from open-ended , 
appropriations to specific appropriation of estimated federal receipts as one 
source of revenue for total program funding. (WDTM?) Federal funds for human 
service programs, transportation, and, to a lesser degree, education, receive 
a high degree of legislative scrutiny during the biennial session. During 
1981, the legislature attached a rider to its appropriations bill which 
requires that if block grants replace categorical grants, the funds should be 
allocated to state departments and agencies as they were under categorical 
grants. 
Utah: The Utah legislature exercises a fairly high degree of control over 

m r a l  funds, through specific sum appropriations to programs and agencies, 

and through an advisory role in the grant application process. In addition, 

the governor, who is empowered to receive federal funds during the interim, 

can only accept funds for one fiscal year. The full legislature must approve 

multi-year .programs in the subsequent session; in addition, they must act on 






Vermont: L i k e  Nevada, t h e  Vermont l e g i s l a t u r e  exe r t s  a  h igh  degree o f  c o n t r o l  
m d e r a l  g ran ts  because of i t s  a u t h o r i t y  t o  accept g ran t  funds p r i o r  t o  
t h e i r  expendi ture (and subsequent t o  guberna to r i a l  approval o f  g ran t  
app l i ca t i ons ) .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h i s  mechanism adopted i n  1979, t he  l e g i s l a t u r e  
a lso  makes spec i f  i c  sum approp r ia t i ons  t o  subprogram l e v e l s  and rev iews grant  
app l i ca t i ons  du r ing  both t h e  session and the  i n te r im .  
V i r  i n i a :  The V i r g i n i a  General Assembly e x e r t s  a moderate degree o f  c o n t r o l
d 7 - ae era1 funds du r ing  i t s  ap rop r ia t i ons  process, making mos t l y  s p e c i f i c  
sum appropr ia t ions  t o  subprogram leve l s .  It has no a u t h o r i t y  over f e d e r a l  
funds du r ing  t h e  i n te r im ,  b u t  does r e s t r i c t  t h e  amount o f  funds above 
appropr ia t ions  t h a t  may be rece ived and spent du r ing  the  i n t e r i m  through 
p rov i s ions  i n  t he  Appropr ia t ions  Act. Under t h e  1981 amendments t o  the  
V i r g i n i a  Appropr ia t ions  Act, t h e  governor must produce q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t s  
summarizing the  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  approvals of f e d e r a l  funds grants. The 
i m p l i c a t i o n s  t o  be i d e n t i f i e d  i nc lude  s i g n i f i c a n t  and a n t i c i p a t e d  budgetary, 
p o l  i c y  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  impacts o f  f e d e r a l  requirements. 
Washin ton: Although t h e  Washington l e g i s l a t u r e  exe r t s  a  h igh  degree o f&over f e d e r a l  funds through i t s  appropr ia t ions  process, i t  i s  a 
b i e n n i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e .  As a consequence, t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  
c o n t r o l s  no g ran ts  du r ing  the  i n t e r i m  weakens i t s  c o n t r o l .  The governor i s  
author ized t o  rece i ve  and spend most unan t i c i pa ted  r e c e i p t s  du r ing  the  
in te r im.  The l e g i s l a t u r e  can moni to r  and develop federal  fund i n fo rma t ion  
through i t s  computerized i n fo rma t ion  system. 
West V i r g i n i a :  Dur ing i t s  1982 session, the  West V i r g i n i a  l e g i s l a t u r e  passed 
a  comprehensive b i l l  dea l i ng  w i t h  l e g i s l a t i v e  ove rs igh t  o f  f ede ra l  funds. - The 
b i l l  requ i res :  
o 	 a l l  f ede ra l  funds t o  be deposi ted i n  a  spec ia l  fund account and made 
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  app rop r ia t i on  by the  l e g i s l a t u r e ;  
o 	 t h e  governor t o  i t em ize  i n  t he  s t a t e  budget, on a l i n e - i t e m  basis, 
separate ly ,  f o r  each spending u n i t ,  t h e  amount and purpose o f  a1 1  
fede ra l  funds rece ived o r  a n t i c i p a t e d  f o r  expenditure; 
o 	 s t a t e  agencies t o  send copies of federa l  g ran t  a p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  t h e  
l e g i s l a t i v e  a u d i t o r  a t  t h e  t ime of submission. 
Wisconsin: A t  t h e  present  t ime, t h e  Wisconsin l e g i s l a t u r e  appropr iates 
Lfederal funds on an open-ended con t i nu ing  basis.  It has i n t e r i m  c o n t r o l  over 
excess s t a t e  matching. funds; t h e  J o i n t  Committee on Finance must appropr ia te  
these funds. The l e g i s l a t u r e  has r e c e n t l y  begun t o  rece i ve  federal  g ran t  
appl i c a t i o n  information. 
Wyoming: The Wyoming 1  e g i  s l  a tu re  main ta ins  a moderate degree o f  
appropr ia t ions  c o n t r o l  over federal  funds du r ing  i t s  b i e n n i a l  budget process, 
making s p e c i f i c  sum approp r ia t i ons  a t  the  program l e v e l .  It does n o t  exe r t  
c o n t r o l  over these funds du r ing  the  i n te r im ,  however; t h e  governor i s  
empowered t o  approve t h e  r e c e i p t  and expendi ture o f  f ede ra l  funds. The 
l e g i s l a t u r e  a l s o  does n o t  review grant  app l ica t ions .  
-- - 
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LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING 
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL FUNDS 
The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  increased s t a t e  c o n t r o l  over  
f e d e r a l  funds t h a t  came w i t h  t he  1981 f e d e r a l  
b lock  g ran t s  he ightened s t a t e  l e g i s l a t i v e  
i n t e r e s t  i n  c o n t r o l  1  i n g  f e d e r a l  funds and 
spawned a s e r i e s  o f  new l e g a l  b a t t l e s  between 
s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  and governors. 
Court ac t i ons  over  t h e  pas t  two years have 
strengthened t h e  case f o r  a s s e r t i n g  a l e g i s -
l a t i v e  r i g h t  t o  app rop r i a t e  f e d e r a l  funds i n  
general  and b lock  g ran t s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  
Dur ing t h i s  same per iod,  however, t h e  case f o r  
l e g i s l a t i v e  de l ega t i on  t o  an i n t e r i m  body o f  
b i nd i ng  a u t h o r i t y  over  f e d e r a l  funds has been 
d e a l t  severa l  blows. 
Case law cen te rs  on t h r e e  issues:  
1. 	 The a u t h o r i t y  o f  l e g i s l a t u r e s  t o  
appropr ia te  f e d e r a l  funds genera l  l y  
2. 	 The r i g h t  o f  l e g i s l a t u r e s  t o  appro-
p r i a t e  t he  f e d e r a l  b l ock  g r a n t  monies 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  
3. 	 The e x t e n t  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  l e g i s l a t i v e  
budget c o n t r o l  d u r i n g  the  i n t e r i m  
Leglslatlve Approprlatlon of 

Federal Funds Generally 

The c o u r t s  have upheld t h e  r i g h t  o f  s t a t e  
l e g i s l a t u r e s  t o  appropr ia te  f e d e r a l  funds i n  
about h a l f  t h e  cases t h a t  have qone t o  cou r t .  
Court  cases o r  op i n i ons  i n  ~ a n s a s ,  Montana, 
and Penns l v a n i a  have a l l  f o m n  m f 
the  &Most recen t l y ,  t he  New York 
l e c l i s l a t u r e  es tab l i shed  i n  c o u r t  i t s  -
app rop r i a t e  f e d e r a l  funds. 
The m a i o r i t v  o ~ i n i o n  on the  New York Court " . 
o f  ~ p p e a l s - c a s e ,  Anderson v. Regan, s a i d  t h a t  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  " a u i t e  s i m ~ lv r e a u i r e s  t h a t  
t he re  be a s p e c i f i d  l eg i s l a t i ; e  app rop r i a t i on  
each t ime  t he  moneys i n  t h e  s t a t e  t r easu ry  are 
spent." I n  so r u l i n g ,  t h e  c o u r t  agreed w i t h  
t he  l e g i s l a t u r e ' s  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
language i n  t he  New York C o n s t i t u t i o n  g ives  i t  
the  a u t h o r i t y  t o  app rop r i a t e  f e d e r a l  funds: 
"No money s h a l l  be pa i d  ou t  o f  t h e  s t a t e  
t r easu ry  o r  any o f  i t s  funds, o r  any of t h e  
funds under i t s  management, except  i n  pursu-
ance of an appropr ia ton  by law." 
(Continued on page 4 )  
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A noteworthy aspect of t he  New York case i s  
t h a t  the c o u r t  dec is ion  l a y s  ou t  a s t r a i g h t -
forward ana lys is  o f  why l e g i s l a t i v e  appropr i -
a t i o n  o f  f ede ra l  funds i s  n o t  o n l y  a l e g i t i -
mate bu t  a l so  a necessary f u n c t i o n  of t he  
l e g i s l a t u r e .  According t o  the  cour t ,  checks 
on the execut ive 's  a b i l i t y  t o  commit the  s t a t e  
t o  f i n a n c i a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  t h a t  must be met by 
taxpayers, a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  i n  government, and 
maintenance o f  t he  balance o f  powers a l l  
demand t h a t  t he  l e g i s l a t u r e  appropr ia te  
s t a t e  funds. 
The cour ts  have n o t  upheld t he  l e g i s l a t i v e  
r i g h t  t o  appropr ia te federa l  funds i n  a l l  i n -
stances. The cou r t s  r u l e d  aqa ins t  t h e  l e s i s -
1  a tu re  i n  Arizona, colorado, ~assachuse i t s ,  
and New ~ e x x ~ h e bas isv y f o r  t h e  
neqat ive f i n d i n g  i n  these s ta tes  was t h a t  
l e g i s l a t i v e  app rop r i a t i on  would v i o l a t e  the  
separat ion o f  powers doc t r ine .  The 1972 
dec is ion  by t he  Colorado Supreme Court i n  
MacManus v. Love perhaps bes t  exempl i f ies  t h i s  
argument: 
The 'colorado C o n s t i t u t i o n  merely 
s ta tes  i n  e f f e c t  t h a t  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  
cannot exerc ise  execut ive  o r  j u d i c i a l  
power . . . 
The l e g i s l a t i v e  power i s  t he  author-
i t y  t o  make laws and t o  appropr ia te  
s t a t e  funds. The enforcement of 
s t a tu tes  and adm in i s t r a t i on  there-
under are execut ive,  n o t  l e g i s l a t i v e ,  
funct ions.  
The power o f  the  General Assembly t o  
make appropr ia t ions  r e l a t e s  t o  s t a t e  
funds. Custodia l  funds are n o t  s t a t e  
moneys . . . fede ra l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
are no t  t he  sub jec t  of the  appropr i -
a t i v e  power o f  the  l e g i s l a t u r e .  
The cour ts ,  then, are d i v i d e d  on t he  i ssue  of 
whether o r  no t  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  have the  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  appropr ia te  f ede ra l  funds. It 
should a l so  be noted, though, t h a t  i n  more 
than two- th i rds  o f  the  s tates,  t he  l e g i s l a t u r e  
does appropr ia te f ede ra l  funds, and i n  most o f  
these s ta tes  the  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  
t o  make such appropr ia t ions  has no t  been 
questioned. 
But t he  l ega l  ana lys is  does n o t  end here. 
Block grants have added a new and significant 
wr i nk le  t o  t he  l e g i s l a t i v e - e x e c u t i v e  debate 
over federa l  funds app rop r i a t i on  author1 t y .  
Loglrlrtlvm Approprlrtlon of Block Oranto 
I n  those s ta tes  where cou r t s  found t h a t  the 
l e g i s l a t u r e  d i d  no t  have t he  a u t h o r i t y  t o  
appropr ia te  federa l  funds, a major bas is  f o r  
t he  f i n d i n g  was t h a t  such app rop r i a t i on  i n t e r -  
f e red  w i t h  an execut ive  f unc t i on .  The s t a t e ' s  
r o l e  w i t h  respec t  t o  f ede ra l  funds, according 
t o  those cou r t s  f i n d i n g  aga ins t  t he  l e g i s l a -
t u re ,  i s  n o t  t o  determine f o r  what purposes 
money should be spent--a l e g i t i m a t e  l e g i s l a -
t i v e  func t ion ,  b u t  r a t h e r  t o  adminis ter  pro-
gram funds i n  a way a l ready s p e c i f i e d  by the  
f ede ra l  government--an execut ive func t ion .  
A 1978 Massachusetts adv isory  op in ion  by the 
j u s t i c e s  o f  the  Supreme J u d i c i a l  Court r e -
f l e c t s  t h i s  l o g i c .  That dec i s i on  concluded 
t h a t  f ede ra l  funds " received by s t a t e  o f f i c e r s  
o r  agencies sub jec t  t o  the c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  they 
be used o n l y  f o r  ob jec t s  s p e c i f i e d  by f ede ra l  
s t a t u t e  o r  r equ la t i ons "  imply a separate 
f ede ra l  t r u s t  and are "not sub jec t  t o  appro-
p r i a t i o n  by t he  l e g i s l a t u r e s "  (emphasis 
added). But, w i t h  respect  t o  t h i s  s o r t  of 
argument, b lock  g ran ts  are a very d i f f e r e n t  
k e t t l e  of f l sh .  
Un l i ke  t h e i r  ca tego r i ca l  s i s t e r s ,  f ede ra l  
b lock grants are intended t o  be used f o r  very 
broad purposes (community development, s o c i a l  
serv ices,  pr imary h e a l t h  care, etc . ) ,  w i t h  t he  
s p e c i f i c  ob jec t s  o f  expendi ture t o  be de te r -
mined by the  s ta tes .  Moreover, Admin is t ra t ion  
spokesmen have emphasized t h a t  t h e  f ede ra l  
government i s  n e u t r a l  w i t h  respec t  t o  the 
degree o f  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t i v e  involvement i n  t h e  
c o n t r o l  of b lock  g ran t  expenditures. 
The Massachusetts l e g i s l a t u r e ,  convinced t h a t  
t he  7978 op in i on  d i d  n o t  cover b lock  grants, 
passed a law i n  1981 g i v i n g  i t  f u l l  appropr i -
a  ions  a u t h o r i t y  over a l l  b lock  g ran ts  and a l l  
u t  a handfu l  o f  o ther  federa l  grants.  The+i  
f e  era1 g ran t  funds excluded f rom the  1981 
IblP1 inc lude,  ' ! f i n a n c r d l s t a n c e  from the  
Uni ted States Government f o r  payments under 
T i t l e s  X V I I I ,  X I X  o r  X X  o f  the Soc ia l  Secu r i t y  
Act o r  o the r  reimbursements rece ived  f o r  s t a t e  
en t i t l emen t  expenditures. . . . and f i n a n c i a l  
ass is tance f o r  d i r e c t  payments t o  i n d i v i -
duals." To date, t he  execut ive branch has no t  
chal lenged the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  the  1981 
act.  
The Colorado l e g i s l a t u r e  a l so  chose t o  i n t e r -
pret-72 Colorado Supreme Court case, 
which denied the  c l a im  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  author-  
i t y  t o  appropr ia te  f e d e r a l  funds, as no t  be ing  
app l i cab le  t o  b lock  grants. I n  i t s  1982-83 
appropr ia t ions  act ,  t he  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  wh!ch had 
no t  before appropr ia ted any federa l  funds, 
appropr ia ted the  b lock  g ran t  monies f o r  
s p e c i f i c  programs and l i n e  items, The 
Governor subsequently vetoed t he  language i n  
the  b i l l  app rop r i a t i ng  t he  b lock  g ran ts  on the 
grounds t h a t  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  d i d  n o t  have the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  t o  appropr ia te  
-- - - -- - - 
federa l  funds. Be1 i ev ing  the  1972 Colorado 
Supreme Court case t o  be no t  appl icable, the 
Colorado l e g i s l a t u r e  decided t o  sue the  
Governor over h i s  veto. The case has no t  y e t  
gone t o  court.  
. . . wordlng of prevloua craea concernlng 
Ieglalrtlve rpproprlrtlon of federal funds 
auggeata there la good reraon to belleve that 
the courts wlll alde wlth the Ieglalaturea. 
Since t h i s  s p e c i f i c  issue has not  y e t  been 
subject t o  j u d i c i a l  review, i t  i s  too e a r l y  t o  
t e l l  whether the  cour ts  w i l l  concur w l t h  t he  
Colorado and Massachusetts l e g i s l a t u r e s '  
assessment t h a t  block and ca tego r i ca l  grants 
are d i f f e ren t  enough from o ther  federal  funds 
t h a t  the cour ts  may be expected t o  uphold 
t h e i r  r i g h t  t o  appropr iate the  former wh i l e  
denying t h e i r  au thor i  t y  t o  a p p r o p r i a t e  the 
l a t t e r .  But a ca re fu l  review of the wording 
of previous cases concernlng l e g  i s 1  a t i v e  
appropr iat ion o f  federa l  funds suggests there  
i s  good reason t o  be l ieve  t h a t  the  cour ts  w i l l  
s ide  w i t h  the l eg i s la tu res .  
Interlm Control Over Federal Funda 
Legis latures t h a t  meet i n  session f o r  on l y  
p a r t  o f  the  year face the problem o f  exer-
c i s i n g  federal  funds overs igh t  dur ing  the 
inter im. The unce r ta in t y  over the  amount o f  
and cond i t ions  on grant  rece ip t s  makes speci-
f i c  sum appropr iat ions problematic i f  no t  
v i r t u a l l y  impossible. Rather than c a l l i n g  a 
specia l  session each t ime a problem ar ises  o r  
leaving a l l  i n t e r i m  decis ions t o  the execut ive 
branch, the choice o f  most l e g i s l a t u r e s  has 
been t o  designate a l e g i s l a t i v e  committee t o  
be responsib le f o r  federa l  funds matters 
dur ing the in te r im.  
Except where a l e g i s l a t u r e  has e x p l i c i t  con-
s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  t o  do so, the  cour ts  
general ly  have denied leg1 s la tu res  the r i g h t  
t o  assign t o  a committee the  powers o f  the  
f u l l  l e g i s l a t u r e  and have concluded t h a t  such 
ac t ion  cons t i t u tes  an unlawful de legat ion  of 
au thor i ty ,  Cases I n  A1 aska, MI ssouri-, Montana 
and most r e c e n t l y  n  o  r  t  h  i  n n 
Oklahoma have found against  t he  s t a t e  l e g i s -
iature. 
There are two main grounds on which the  cour ts  
have st ruck down i n t e r i m  overs ight  comni t-
tees. The f i r s t  i s  unconstitutional delega-
t i o n  o f  author i  t y :  those powers spec i f  i c a l  l y  
vested i n  the  f u l l  l e g i s l a t u r e  may no t  be 
delegated t o  a subgroup o f  the  f u l l  l e g i s l a -
ture,  The second i s  v i o l a t i o n  o f  the  separa- 
t i o n  o f  powers doctr ine:  review o f  grant 
app l ica t ions  and approval o f  expenditure p lans 
are executive, no t  l e g i s l a t l v e  funct ions.  
The recent  opin ion by the  North Carol ina 
Supreme Court, wh ick  found unconsti  t u t i onaT  
the delegat ion of approval / d i s a ~ ~ r o v a l  author-
i t y  ove r  i n t e r i m  federal rece ip t s  t o  North 
Caro l ina 's  Jo in t  Leg i s la t i ve  Committee t o  
Review Federal Funds, of fers a  good example o f  
j u d i c l a l  reasoning i n  r e j e c t i n g  i n t e r i m  l e g i s -  
l a t  i v e  overs igh t  c o m i  t tees :  
. . . If the General Assembly has the 

a u t h o r K y  t o  determine whether the 

S ta te  or  i t s  agencies w i l l  accept the 

grants i n  question, and, if accepted, 

t he  a u t h o r i t y  t o  determine how the 

funds w i l l  be spent, i t  i s  our con-

s idered opin ion t h a t  the General 

Assembly may no t  delegate t o  a l e g i s - 

l a t i v e  committee the power t o  make 

those dec isions. 

I n  several of the instances se t  f o r t h  

i n  [ the  law i n  quest ion]  the comrnit- 

t ee  would be exerc is ing  l e g i s l a t i v e  

funct ions. I n  those instances there 

would be an unlawful delegat ion o f  

legislative power. I n  the other 

instances the  committee would be 

exerc is ing  a u t h o r i t y  t h a t  i s  execu-

t i v e  o r  admin is t ra t ive  i n  character. 

I n  those instances there  would be a 

v i o l a t i o n  o f  the separat ion o f  powers 

provis ions of the Const i tu t ion  and an 

encroachment upon the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  

power o f  the  Governor. As s ta ted  

above, our Cons t i t u t i on  vests i n  the 

General Assembly the power t o  enact a 

budget--to appropri  ate f u n m u t  

a f t e r  t h a t  i s  done, A r t i c l e  111, 

Section 5(3) e x p l i c i t l y  provides t h a t  

" the Governor s h a l l  administer the 





The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  it y  o f  i n te r im  federa l  funds 
overs igh t  committee; i n  South Carol ina and 
Kentuck i s  a lso  c u r r e n t l y  being questibned, dec sions i n  these cases have not  as y e t  
been handed down. 
The cour ts  have not  r u l e d  against the  assign- 
ment o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  du t i es  t o  an i n t e r i m  com- 
m i t t ee  i n  a l l  cases. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court, i n  a 1977 case, upheld the method of 
appointment t o  and func t ions  of the Leg is l  a- 
t i v e  Budget Comi t t ee ,  which has b ind ing  con-
t r o l  over unan t i c i  pated federal  rece ip ts .  
Add i t iona l ly ,  i n  17 states,  i n t e r i m  l e g i s l a -
t i v e  bodies have binding con t ro l  over the 
r e c e i p t  o f  unant ic ipated federal funds, and i n  
most o f  these s ta tes  the  au tho r i t y  of these 
bodies has no t  been challenged. 
States concerned t h a t  they do no t  have the 
a u t h o r i t y  t o  create an i n t e r i m  commlttee w l t h  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  r e v i s e  block grant  o r  other 
federa l  funds agpropr iat lons have several Iopt ions open t o  them. 
I 
F i r s t ,  they can fo l low Ore on s lead and 
seek a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a& a l lowing 
the l e g i s l a t u r e  t o  delegate i t s  a u t h o r i t y  
dur ing the  in te r im.  However, c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l  amendment proposals s i m i l a r  t o  
Oregon's have f a i l e d  i n  Alaska and Montana. 
Second, l e g i s l a t u r e s  may d e t a i l  i n  t h e i r  
appropr iat ions b i l l s  j u s t  how federa l  
funds are t o  be spent dur ing the  i n t e r i m  
should add i t i ona l  funds become ava i l ab le  
o r  federal funding cutbacks occur. Iowa's 
1982-83 federa l  funds a p p r o p r i a t i o n s b l l l  
(H.F. 2477) includes de ta i  led  procedures 
t o  be fo l lowed by the  governor i n  the 
event t h a t  federa l  funds are more o r  less  
than ant ic ipa ted o r  federa l  block grants 
are consol idated o r  expanded. 
Third, t o  1i m i t  the  governor's d i s c r e t i o n  
wh i le  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  i s  no t  i n  session, 
l eg i s la tu res  may f o l l o w  Minnesota's lead 
i n  a l lowing the  governor t o  on l y  spend 
one-fourth o f  whatever new monies may be- 
come ava i l ab le  dur ing the  i n te r im ,  r e -
serv ing the balance t o  be appropriated by 
the, l e g i s l a t u r e  a t  i t s  next session. 
Fourth, l e g i s l a t u r e s  can ho ld  o f f  appro-
p r i a t i n g  federa l  funds u n t i l  t h e  funds 
have a c t u a l l y  been received o r  t he  exact 
nature o f  the  grants are known and then 
requ i re  a specia l  session f o r  appropr i -
at ion. Montana d i d  t h i s  i n  1981. 
F ina l l y ,  i n  those s ta tes  where there  i s  no 
lega l  l i m i t  on the  length o f  the l e g i s l a -
t i v e  session, the  l e g i s l a t u r e  may .decide 
t o  recess instead o f  adjourn i n  order t o  
maintain con t ro l  over federa l  funds. 
This i s  an excerpt from, "Strengthen1 ng Legi s- 
l a t i v e  Oversight o f  Federal Funds: Problems 
Issues and &proaches," L e g i s l a t i v e  Finance 
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1979 Findings on State Mandased Proqrams. The 1979 i n t e r i m  
Cmit t e e  on Local Government recommended the  fo r  1 owing: 
. . . t h a t  the  requirement t h a t  county assessors main ta in  
maps which they are c u r r e n t l y  requ i red  t o  prepare f o r  
t h e i r  counties. Such maintenance would be d i s c r e t i o n a r y  
w i t h  each county assessor. The comni t t e e  recognized the 
importance o f  prepar ing these maps i n  order  t h a t  
count ies may develop accurate in format ion  regarding 
valuat ions.  It f e l t ,  however, t h a t  a cont inu ing 
maintenance requirement was unnecessary. 
... Al low the  Board o f  County Commissioners o f  each 
county t o  post  t a x  no t i ces  and repor t s  o f  claims and 
expenditures paid by the  county r a t h e r  than publ ish 
these no t i ces  i n  a l e g a l  newspaper. I n  the  event the  
board decides t o  post  these not ices,  i t  s h a l l  f u r n i s h  a 
copy of t he  r e p o r t  t o  every l e g a l  newspaper i n  the  
county. 
... Al low the  burning o f  s o l i d  wastes by both commercial 
and noncommercial i n t e r e s t s  i n  count ies o f  l ess  than 
25,000 persons when, i n  the  op in ion  o f  the  
comnissioners, such burning w i l l  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  a publ i c  
nuisance which i s  i n j u r i o u s  t o  the hea l th  and sa fe ty  o f  
t he  people. It was intended t o  a l l ow  county 
commissioners increased f l e x i  b i l l  t y  i n  meeting the  
i n d i v i d u a l  needs o f  t he  county and so reduce costs. 
... Change the  fees f o r  accepting and processing an 
a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  a permi t  f o r  an i n d i v i d u a l  sewage 
disposal  system from a f i x e d  fee ( n o t  exceeding $75) t o  
a fee based on the  average cos t  of processing t h e  
appl i c a t i o n  i n  the  preceding year. Testimony ind i ca ted  
t h a t  t he  cu r ren t  fee s t r u c t u r e  was inadequate t o  cover 
r a i s i n g  cos ts  o f  inspection. 
... Permit t h e  mod i f i ca t i on  o r  waiver o f  a mine 
opera tor 's  d u t i e s  where a county was conduct ing a 
1i m i ted  impact opera t ion  f o r  t he  e x t r a c t i o n  o f  mineral  s 
used i n  the  cons t ruc t i on  o r  maintenance o f  county roads. 
Cur ren t l y  count ies are  responsib le f o r  f u l f i l l  i ng  a1 1 
t h e  rec lamat ion d u t i e s  app l i cab le  t o  a p r i v a t e  f i r m  when 
engaged i n  mining. Again, t h i s  represents a 
cons ide rab l  e cos t  imposed on county government which 
might  be reduced. 
. . . Permit the  Sta te  Department o f  Heal t h  t o  b r i n g  s u i t  
o r  o the r  ac t i on  aga ins t  a l o c a l  board o f  hea l th  f o r  
being unwil  1 i n g  t o  a c t  t o  prevent the  spread o f  
contagious diseases. Current ly ,  the  s t a t e  can b r ing  
s u i t  i f  the  l o c a l  board "...i s  unable o r  u n w i l l i n g "  t o  
abate the  spread o f  contagious diseases. I n  add i t ion ,  
p rov ide  t h a t  the  nonprevai l  i ng  s ide  i n  such a case, 
r a t h e r  than the  1 ocal board o f  health, would bear the  
expenses o f  t he  case. 
.. . Provide t h a t  a publ i c  o f f i c i a l  o r  employee 
becompensated only a t  a r a t e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  equa h is  
normal income leve l  whi le  t h a t  o f f i c i a l  o r  employee i s  
on annual m i l i t a r y  leave. This would reduce "double 
dipping". 
. . . Redefine "seasonal empl oymen tUf o r  the purpose o f  
the Colorado Employment Secur i ty  Act (unemployment 
insurance) t o  reduce a loca l  government's 1 i a b i l  i t y  f o r  
seasonal workers such as park workers, l i f e  guards, and 
s i m i l a r  seasonal employees. 
... Broaden the categories o f  s t a te  t r a f f i c  offenses f o r  
which a por t ion  o f  the resu l t i ng  f ines, penalties,or 
f o r f e i t u r e s  co l lec ted  by loca l  au tho r l t i e s  could be 
retained. These offenses would consi s t  o f  d r l v i ng  under 
the inf luence, d r l v i n g  whi le  one's a b i l i t y  i s  Impaired, 
v i o l a t i ons  o f  r e g l s t r a t i o n  o r  d r i v e r  1 lcensing laws, 
v i o l a t i ons  o f  obligations o f  persons Involved i n  a 
t r a f f i c  accident, and v i o l a t l ons  o f  motor veh lc le  
equipment requirements. This would al low loca l  
governments t o  recover some o f  the costs incurred by 
them as a r e s u l t  o f  enforc ing s ta te  statutes. 
... Require the Department o f  Social SErvlces t o  pay 85 
percent o f  the prevlous month's medicaid reimbursement 
t o  each nursing home vendor on the f l r s t  o f  the month. 
The remainder should then be pald based on actual 
b i l l i n g s .  The proposal i s  intended t o  reduce the cash 
f low problems now belng experienced by nursing homes as 
a resul  t o f  1 a te  s ta te  reimbursement payments. 
... A1 low county departments o f  socia l  servlces t o  
r e t a l n  50 percent o f  the amount o f  f raudulent ly  obtained 
publ ic ass1 stance o r  f raudulent ly  obtained overpayment 
which they recover. This i s  Intended as an inducement 
t o  county government t o  b igorously pursue these cases i n  
the manner they f i n d  most appropriate. 
. . . Require the s ta te  t o  increase the advancement o f  
funds t o  countles f o r  homemaker servlces f o r  e l de r l y  and 
disabled c l i e n t s  from 80 percent t o  90 percent. This i s  
intended t o  d l  scourage the p l  acement o f  e l de r l y  o r  
disabled ind iv idua ls  i n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  ized set t ings such 
as county nursing homes. 
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Revenue L im i ts  
Colorado statutem l i m i t  the growth i n  property tax revenues for  loca l  govern-
menta t o  7% annually p lus an adjustment factor . This l im i t a t i on  i s  an 
expression of publ ic  resistance t o  increased government taxation, and ps r t i c -
u l a r l y  t o  property taxes. However, other factors also b u i l d  pressure on 
government budgets -- fsctors such ae i n f l a t i on ;  variat ions i n  population, l oca l  
tax structures, economic conditions, and service neede; reductions i n  federal 
aesistance t o  state and loca l  governments; and increased costs i n  cap i ta l  
investment financing. State and federal mandates generate non-discretionary 
loca l  spending for  spec i f ic  purposes without concern for  overa l l  community 
needs, p r i o r i t i e s ,  and f inanc ia l  capacity. 
Revenue l imi ta t ions,  expenditure l imi ta t ions,  and unfunded mandates imposed by 
one l eve l  o f  government on another are inconsistent wi th the basic pr incip les of 
l o c a l  cont ro l  and representative government. These pr inc ip les  are the foun-
datione for  l oca l  aelf-governance, and can only be achieved when loca l  govern- 
ments have the author i ty  and the respons ib i l i ty  to determine expenditures and to  
ra ise revenues. 
Any strategy for  addreseing these iseues should be deeigned t o  increase l oca l  
f l e x i b i l i t y  and t o  minimize constraints. Where poseible, the accountabi l i ty for 
l i v i n g  wi th in  constraints should reet  wi th the l eve l  o f  government at  which 
those conetrsinte ere imposed. 
R e c r n d s t i o n :  	 Future coeta which are mandated by ths sta te  should be 
f u l l y  funded by the state. The s ta te  should also pursue 
new f inanc ia l  arrang-nta f o r  ex ia t inq state-mandated 
programs thich form ncm-diecretionary gpending by local 
govemwnts. After thee steps have bssn taken, ttm 
state  should mvaluete  ttm need for ttm 7% l i m i t  now 
iqmsod on property tax rwenuea of units of  local 
g o v e m n t. 
Socia l  Services  
The cur ren t  pa t t e rn  of s o c i a l  s e rv i ce s  del ivery provides l imi ted  d i s c r e t i on  t o  
county governments. The s t a t e  serves a s  t h e  c e n t r a l  con t ro l  point t o  assure  
compliance w i t h  federa l  and s t a t e  laws and regulat ions.  In t h i s  
s ta te-aupervised,  county-administered system, county governments finance 20% of  
t h e  c o s t s  and t h e  s t a t e  funds 80%. A t  the  county l eve l  these c o s t s  a r e  financed 
through the  property t a x ,  and they impact t he  county s t r u c t u r e  a s  
non-discretionary expenditures.  Since county revenues f a l l  under t h e  7% 
property t ax  l i m i t ,  non-discretionary expendi tures  force  reductions i n  
d i sc re t ionary  spending where resources  a r e  l imi ted .  The Commission f e e l s  t h a t  
t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  both county adminis t ra t ion and f i nanc i a l  involve-
ment has changed, and t h a t  t h e  present system should be adjusted t o  place 
g rea t e r  f i s c a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i t h  s t a t e  government, where cont ro l  of 
ent i t lement  and non-discretionary programs c l e a r l y  res ides .  
Recommendation: 	 The State hould a e e w  e l l  abiniatrative rasponaibility 
for mandated public assistance progrm by Jenuery 1984, 
and should r e l i w e  carntias of a l l  financinq reapon-
s ib i l i ty  for tho- program by January 1985. (The sug-
geattmd procesa and rationale for atate amuption are 
developed further in Chapter I of this  volume). 
Court a 
The preaent court  system is governed, administered, and pr imari ly  funded by 
s t a t e  government. The exception is courtroom f a c i l i t i e s  financing, which 
cont inues t o  be a non-discretionary r e spons ib i l i t y  of  the  count ies .  T h i s  
r e spons ib i l i t y  c o s t s  l oca l  governments an e a t  imat ed $9 mi l l ion  annually. 
Although, a s  a matter of  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h i s  Commission does not support t h e  
imposit  ion of non-discretionary c o s t s  .on u n i t s  of l oca l  governments, we do not 
f e e l  it reasonable t o  expect a l l  mandated c o s t s  t o  be removed a t  t h i s  time. We 
be l i eve  the  S t a t e  should cont inue t o  review the  l o c a l  cour t  f inancing problem i n  
t h e  context of l o c a l  c a p i t a l  investments. We be l ieve  t h a t  such financing 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  a s  might emerge from such a review, combined w i t h  s t a t e  assumption 
of mandated s o c i a l  s e rv i ce s  and the  recommended ac t ion  on revenue limits, would 
provide s u f f i c i e n t  r e l i e f  t o  allow l o c a l  governments t o  handle cour t  costs .  
J a i l s  
Recent cour t  dec is ions  -- a t  both s t a t e  and federa l  l eve l s  -- support the 
p r inc ip l e  t h a t  a pr isoner  r e t a i n s  a l l  t h e  r i g h t s  of an ordinary c i t i z e n  except 
those  expressly or  by necessary implicat ion taken from him by law. Given the 
s i z e ,  age and general  condi t ion of many Colorado j a i l s ,  many loca l  goverrnnents 
and loca l  of f i c i a l s  a r e  finding themselves o f f i c i a l l y  and personally l i a b l e  in 
cou r t s  of law. 
Colorado has no uniform standards for the construct ion and operation of j a i l  
f a c i l i t i e s .  T h i s  lack of etandards may make loca l  goverrments more vulnerable 
t o  laweuite, and ce r t a in ly  complicstes the  procees of asseesinq cap i t a l  con-
e t ruc t ion  neede . A conservat ive etatewide eetimate of j a i l  construction needs 
through 1986 i e  $100 million. 
County j a i l e  a r e  required by Colorado s t a t u t e e ,  and s ign i f i can t  portions of j a i l  
and sheriff' budget8 a r e  spent implementing e t a t e  lawe. Therefore, the  s t a t e  has 
a reeponeibi l i ty  t o  help counties  eolve j a i l  problems. A t  the eame time, loca l  
control  over police and j a i l  se rv ices  i e  cen t r a l  t o  the pr inc ip les  of loca l  
governance. Whatever ro l e  the s t a t e  assumee toward j a i l  financing should not 
compromise t h a t  control .  
R e m n d e t i o n t  	 The S t a t e  should reconsider a wt of minimal jail stan-
dards J l i c h  would serve t o  pro tec t .  cons t i t u t iona l  rights.  
A t  t he  request of individual  counties ,  t he  S ta te ,  (through 
i t e  Divieion of Criminel Jus t i ce )  should provide technical  
a s s i s t a n c e  t o  br ing f a c i l i t i e s  up t o  those standards o r  to  
cour t  mndates.  
In t h e  future,  t h e  s t a t e  should fu l ly  fud the  incremental 
increaeea i n  jail c o s t s  brought about by s t a t e  mandates on 
l o c a l  government. Further,  t h i s  Colmiasicm requeats t he  
Division o f  C r i n i m l  J u s t i c e  i n  t h e  Department of Local 
Af fa i r s  t o  anelyze the cumulative impact of HB 1232 (1981) 
and t o  report  t o  the  h r a l  k s s d l y  on t h e t  irpect i n  
Januery 1983. 
Local Water and Sewer Systems 
The current  pa t te rn  of l oca l  water and eewer construct ion,  operation and 
maintenance must meet both federal  and s t a t e  standards for public health and 
environmental protect ion.  Recent reductions in  federal  support by t h e  Environ- 
mental Protect ion Agency, t he  Farmers Home Administration, and the Economic 
Development Agency, and a s h i f t  i n  p r i o r i t i e s  by the  Colorado Water Conservation 
Board away from .municipal water system ass is tance  have dramatically affected 
h i s t o r i c a l  pa t te rns  of intergovernmental financing. These changes have occurred 
a t  the  same time borrowing cos t s  have increased. Local capacity t o  finance 
construction and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  va r i e s  w i t h  economic f e a s i b i l i t y ,  access to  the 
market, bonding l imi t a t ions ,  an t ic ipa ted  growth, and the  ac tua l  c o s t s  of meeting 
standards and regulat ions.  The Commission f ee l s  t ha t  the s t a t e  should be 
involved i n  providing loca l  water and sewer ass i s tance  t o  meet ex is t ing  stan- 
dards and respond t o  loca l  f inancia l  problems. 
R e c a a n d a t i o m r  	 We rscunrnsnd t h a t  t h e  a t a t e  legislature provide s ta tu tory  
author iza t ion  t o  f inancia l ly  a s s i s t  loca l  goverment u n i t s  
t o  meet clean drinking water standards. Further, ns 
eupport the crea t ion  of a Leg i s l a t ive  Interim C d t t w  t o  
s tudy t h e  long-range ierrues of water and wwer financing 
alternatives. 
